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a b s t r a c t
In many theorem proving applications, a proper treatment of
equational theories or equality is mandatory. In this paper,
we show how to integrate a modern treatment of equality in
the Model Evolution calculus (ME ), a first-order version of
the propositional DPLL procedure. The new calculus, ME E, is
a proper extension of the ME calculus without equality. Like
ME it maintains an explicit candidate model, which is searched
for by DPLL-style splitting. For equational reasoning ME E uses
an adapted version of the superposition inference rule, where
equations used for superposition are drawn (only) from the
candidate model. The calculus also features a generic, semantically
justified simplification rule which covers many simplification
techniques known from superposition-style theorem proving. Our
main theoretical result is the correctness of theME E calculus in
the presence of very general redundancy elimination criteria. We
also describe our implementation of the calculus, the E-Darwin
system, andwe report on practical experiments with it on the TPTP
problem library.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Model Evolution (ME ) calculus (Baumgartner and Tinelli, 2003, 2008) is a refutational
calculus for clause logic developed as a first-order extension of the propositional DPLL procedure
(Davis et al., 1962). Compared to its predecessor, the FDPLL calculus (Baumgartner, 2000),ME lifts to
first-order logic without equality not just the core of the DPLL procedure, the splitting rule, but also
its simplification rules, which are crucial for its practical feasibility.
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Our implementation of ME , the Darwin theorem prover (Baumgartner et al., 2006), performs
well in some domains but, unsurprisingly, not on problems with equality which it can treat only
with the explicit addition of equality axioms. This is a serious shortcoming in practice because the
majority of automated reasoning applicationswork in logics with equality. In Baumgartner and Tinelli
(2005) we addressed the problem by proposing an extension ofME with dedicated inference rules
for equality reasoning. These rules were centered around a version of the ordered paramodulation
inference rule adapted to ME . This paper presents an extensively revised and improved version of
that calculus, called ME E, that relies more heavily on notions and techniques originally developed
for the Superposition calculus (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1998). As a result, ME E features more
powerful redundancy criteria, and, by means of selection functions, removes some non-determinism
from the calculus in Baumgartner and Tinelli (2005). We prove the soundness and completeness of
ME E in full detail and discuss an initial implementation in the E-Darwin theorem prover, largely
based on Darwin. The completeness proof is obtained as an extension of the ME completeness
proof by adapting techniques from the Bachmair–Ganzinger framework developed for proving the
completeness of superposition (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1998; Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001, e.g.).
The underlying model construction technique allows us to justify a rather general simplification rule
on semantic grounds. The simplification rule is based on a general redundancy criterion that covers
many simplification techniques known from superposition-style theorem proving.
These adaptations are non-trivial because of the rather different layout of the two calculi. While
superposition maintains clause sets as its main data structure, ME E works with a set of literals,
which we call a context, and a set of (constrained) clauses. ME E has, correspondingly, two kinds of
inference rules, one for modifying contexts, and one for deriving new (constrained) clauses, with the
latter consisting mostly of unit-superposition style inference rule. Since there is no counterpart to
contexts in superposition calculi, the inference rules on contexts are specific to our calculus, as are
the redundancy criteria we present.
Related work. LikeME , theME E calculus is related to instance based methods (IMs), a family of cal-
culi and proof procedures for first-order (clausal) logic that share the principle of carrying out proof
search by maintaining a set of instances of input clauses and analyzing it for satisfiability until com-
pletion (Baumgartner, 2007; Korovin, 2009). Most IMs are based on resolving pairs of complementary
literals (connections) from two clauses in order to determine these instances. In contrast,ME ’s main
derivation rule (splitting) is based on evaluating all literals of a single clause against a current candi-
date model in order to determine an instance. See Baumgartner and Tinelli (2008) for a more detailed
discussion ofME in relation to IMs, which also applies toME E when equality is not an issue.
There are only a few IMs that include inference rules for equality reasoning. Ordered Semantic
Hyperlinking (OSHL) by Plaisted and Zhu (2000) uses rewriting and narrowing (paramodulation)
with unit equations, but requires some other mechanism such as Brand’s transformation to handle
equations that appear in nonunit clauses.
To our knowledge there are only two IMs that have been extended with dedicated equality
inference rules for full equational clausal logic. One of them is described by Ganzinger and Korovin
(2004) as an extension of the earlier IM by the same authors (Ganzinger and Korovin, 2003). It is
conceptually rather different fromME E: the main inference rule for equational reasoning requires,
as a subtask, the refutation of a set of unit clauses (which is obtained by picking literals from the
current clause set). More closely related to ME E is an IM based on disconnection tableaux by Letz
and Stenz, a successor of Billon’s disconnectionmethod (Billon, 1996).1 Letz and Stenz discuss various
ways of integrating equality reasoning in disconnection tableaux (Letz and Stenz, 2002), including
a variant based on ordered paramodulation. These paramodulation inferences combine (equational)
branch literals and clauses into new clauses, where the equation used for paramodulation is added in
negated form (as a condition) to the paramodulant. Our main equality inference rules work similarly,
and in this sense the calculus of Letz and Stenz (2002) andME E are conceptually related. ButME E
features more powerful and general concepts of redundancy detection and elimination.
1 Even in that early paper a paramodulation-like inference rule was considered, albeit a rather weak one.
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Finally,ME has been combined with the superposition calculus in a single framework, including
equality inference rules by Baumgartner and Waldmann (2009). On the one hand, by this very
combination, their calculus is more general than ME E. On the other hand, ME E has some features
that are not present in that calculus e.g., universal variables, which enable the optional derivation
rules Assert and Compact and lead to a more powerful redundancy criterion. Another difference lies
in the way constrained clauses are ordered, which enables additional redundancy criteria that would
be non-trivial to integrate in the calculus in Baumgartner and Waldmann (2009).
Paper organization. We start with an informal explanation of themain ideas behind theME E calculus
in Section 2. After some technical preliminaries in Section 3, we provide a more formal treatment
of the main data structures of the calculus in Section 4, where we describe contexts and their
associated interpretations, and Section 5,wherewedescribe constrained clauses and inference rules for
performing equality reasoning on them. We then present theME E calculus in Section 6, and discuss
its correctness in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss an initial implementation of the calculus together
with comparative experimental results. We conclude in Section 9, suggesting a few directions for
further research. Detailed proofs of all the results in the paper can be found in the Appendix.
2. Main ideas
Similarly to theME calculus,ME E is informally best described with an eye to the propositional
DPLL procedure it extends. DPLL can be viewed as a procedure that searches the space of possible
interpretations for a given clause set until it finds one that satisfies the clause set, if it exists. This can
be done by keeping a current candidate model and repairing it as needed until it satisfies every input
clause. The repairs are done incrementally by changing the truth value of one (propositional) clause
literal at a time, and involve a non-deterministic guess, a ‘‘split’’, on whether the value of a selected
literal should be changed or kept as it is. The number of guesses is reduced thanks to a constraint
propagation process, usually referred to as ‘‘unit propagation’’, that is able to deduce deterministically
the value of some input literals.
BothME andME E lift this idea to first-order logic by (i) maintaining a first-order candidatemodel,
(ii) deriving new clauses based on that model, (iii) identifying instances of derived clauses that are
falsified by themodel, and (iv) repairing themodel incrementally until it satisfies all of those instances.
The main difference between the two calculi is that ME works with Herbrand models while ME E
works with equational models, or E-interpretations, that is, Herbrand interpretations in which the
equality symbol is the only predicate symbol and always denotes a congruence relation. The current
E-interpretation is constructed from the current context, a finite set of oriented equational literals
processed by the calculus. As wewill show, each contextΛ determines a (convergent) ground rewrite
system RΛ. The E-interpretation associated with the context is the congruence closure R⋆Λ of RΛ.
Context literals can be of two types: universal and parametric. As we will see later, the difference
between the two lies in how they constrain the possible modifications of a context and, as a
consequence, the possible repairs to its induced E-interpretation. As far as determining the induced
E-interpretation, however, the two types of context literals are interchangeable.
For convenience, let us say that a contextΛ satisfies/falsifies a literal or a clause if its associated E-
interpretation R⋆Λ does so. As mentioned above, during the course of a derivation, the current context
Λ is modified if it falsifies a current, derived clause. Such a repair involves in essence two steps:
(i) identifying an instance of a current clause that is falsified by the current context, and (ii) adding a
new literal to the context so that the new context satisfies that instance. The first step is achieved by
deriving new clauses by applying (unit) superposition-style inference rules to literals in the context
and clauses in the current clause set until an empty clause is derived.
Each derived clause carries with it a constraint recording all the equalities and disequalities of Λ
involved in the inferences used to derive it. In particular, a derived empty clause D has the form  ·Γ
where  is the empty disjunction and Γ , a set of equational literals, is the constraint. A (ground) con-
straint is satisfied by a contextΛ if all of its equalities are contained in RΛ, the ground rewrite system
induced byΛ, and none of its disequalities is. The clause D is then falsified if for some substitution σ ,
Γ σ is satisfied in this sense. In that case, the calculus addresses the problemby adding toΛ, if possible,
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(a variant of) the complement K of some literal K in Γ .2 This typically ensures that the new context
satisfies some (possibly, all) ground instances of K and, as a consequence, some ground instances of
D . If some instances of D remain falsified, a new empty clause reflecting that will be derivable later.
Note that the rules of ME E do not actually work with RΛ but with the literals in Λ and
their instances obtained by unification with clause literals. The rewrite system RΛ, a conceptual
construction we use to explain the calculus and prove its completeness, is only approximated at
the calculus level. In practice, this may sometimes lead to unnecessary inferences. That, however,
is not a problem from a correctness perspective as long as all inferences theoretically necessary for
completeness are carried out.
The choice to repair the context with the complement of a constraint literal K of ·Γ is don’t-know
non-deterministic since it just produces a local repair that may fail to lead to a model for the input
clause set. Hence, itmust be paired in the calculuswith a corresponding complementary action.When
K shares variables with some other literal in Γ , this action consists in adding (a parametric variant of)
K instead of K , a laDPLL. Otherwise, it consists in replacing·Γ with·(Γ \K).While neither of these
alternative complementary actions repairs the context, each one constitutes progress in the derivation
since it effectively forces the calculus to look at other constraint literals in  · Γ for the repair. When
no literals in Γ can be used, the context is unrepairable and backtracking to a previous choice point is
necessary. With a fair derivation strategy, the calculus guarantees that whenever no more clauses are
derivable (modulo redundancy) and the context has been repaired, perhaps in the limit, to satisfy all
current constrained empty clauses, its associated E-interpretation is a model of the input clause set.
For an example of how a derivation might proceed consider the following input clause setΦ0:
Q (x, a) ≈ t ∨ P(f (x)) ≈ t (1)
g(x) ≈ x (2)
f (g(x)) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x (3)
where x is a variable and t a constant.
The initial context,Λ0, consists of a pseudo-literal of the form ¬v. Its associated E-interpretation,
as we will become clear later, is the identity relation over the set T (Σ) of all ground terms, whereΣ
is the signature ofΦ0. Note that such an E-interpretation falsifies each clause inΦ0. In fact, it falsifies
every ground instance of each clause. This situation is reflected in the calculus by the fact that a unit
resolution-like rule applies to the pseudo-literal¬v and a clause inΦ0. Repeated applications of such
a rule may lead to the derivation of the constrained clauses below.3
Q (x, a) ≈ t · P(f (x)) ≉ t (4)
 · Q (x, a) ≉ t, P(f (x)) ≉ t (5)
 · g(x) ≉ x (6)
f (g(x)) ≈ x · h(x) ≉ x (7)
The constraint of each derived clause can be understood as a set of preconditions for the clause. Roughly
speaking, it represents a set of ground facts that held in the current interpretation at the time the
clause was derived. If later one of these ground facts does not hold anymore because of changes to the
context, the corresponding ground instances of the constrained clause are, in essence, removed from
consideration. For instance, the constraint of clause (4) states that when the clause was derived (from
clause (1)) all ground instances of P(f (x)) ≉ t were satisfied in the current context. The derivation
of empty constrained clauses , like (5) and (6) above, indicates that the current context needs to be
repaired. For clause (6) the only possible repair is to add the universal literal g(x) ≈ x to Λ0. In this
case, the alternative, namely replacing  · g(x) ≉ x with  · ∅, not only fails to repair the context, it
2 Adding K is not possible if it is contradictorywithΛ (see later) because thenΛ ∪ {K} denotes no E-interpretation.
3 Later in the paper we will use → instead of ≈ in constraint and context literals to stress that they are oriented
(dis)equalities. But we can overlook this technicality for now.
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also makes it unrepairable—because of the addition of the unconstrained empty clause  · ∅ to the
clause set.
With the new contextΛ1 = {¬v, g(x) ≈ x}, the induced rewrite system RΛ1 is a certain subset of
E = {g(t) ≈ t | t ∈ T (Σ)} having the same congruence closure as E.4 The associated interpretation
(the congruence closure of RΛ1 ) now satisfies every ground instance of clause (6). A superposition rule
applied to the new context literal g(x) ≈ x and to clause (3) derives the clause
f (x) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · g(x) ≈ x (8)
The fact that g(x) ≈ x in Λ1 is universal guarantees that any later extensions of Λ1 will satisfy
every ground instance of the constraint literal g(x) ≈ x. This allows the simplification of (8) to the
unconstrained clause
f (x) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x (9)
From that clause, the calculus can derive
 · f (x) ≉ x, h(x) ≉ x (10)
because the current context Λ1 satisfies every ground instance of f (x) ≉ x and of h(x) ≉ x. Since
clause (10) is empty, a repair is necessary. That can be done with the addition of the parametric literal
f (u) ≈ u, resulting in the new contextΛ2 = {¬v, g(x) ≈ x, f (u) ≈ u}. From this context and clause
(4) it is possible to derive, in order, the clauses
P(x) ≈ t · Q (x, a) ≉ t, f (x) ≉ x (11)
 · Q (x, a) ≉ t, f (x) ≉ x, P(x) ≉ t (12)
Clause (12) requires another repair for the context, for instance into Λ3 = {¬v, g(x) ≈ x, f (u) ≈
u, P(v) ≈ t} with P(v) ≈ t parametric. At this point, no new clauses can be derived. Furthermore,
no more repairs are needed, or in fact possible, since the latest one took care of both clause (12) and
clause (5)—the latter of which was also pending. At this point the calculus stops. The E-interpretation
associated toΛ3 is the congruence closure of
{g(t) ≈ t | t ∈ T (Σ)} ∪ {f (t) ≈ t | t ∈ T (Σ)} ∪ {P(t) ≈ t | t ∈ T (Σ)}.
This interpretation is indeed a model of the initial clause set {Q (x, a) ≈ t ∨ P(f (x)) ≈ t, g(x) ≈
x, f (g(x)) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x}.
If the clause set also contained the clause C = P(x) ≉ t, say, the context Λ3 would not only still
fail to satisfy the clause set, for falsifying C; it would also be unrepairable with respect to C . In that
case, the addition of P(v) ≉ t toΛ2 instead of P(v) ≈ twould have to be considered, leading then to
a repair with Q (v, a) ≈ t from clause (12).
Because of the splitting rules the ME E calculus formally generates derivation trees. What we
described in the example above is essentially one branch of a derivation tree for the given clause
set that ends with a model. As discussed in that example, some derivation tree branches may end
with a context that still falsifies some input clause but is unrepairable. The generation of a closed tree,
a tree all of whose branches end with an unrepairable context, is a proof that the initial clause set
is unsatisfiable in first-order logic with equality. This makes theME E calculus refutationally sound
for that logic. The calculus is also refutationally complete, that is, guaranteed to generate a closed
derivation tree starting from any unsatisfiable clause set when used with a fair derivation strategy.
As expected,ME E is not terminating for all input clause sets. Specifically, for a satisfiable clause set
it can generate a derivation tree all of whose non-closed branches need infinitely many repairs to
produce amodel. Wewill show however that, similarly toME , it is terminating for input sets that are
clause forms of sets of ∃∗∀∗-formulas with equality, a well known decidable fragment of first-order
logic (Bernays and Schönfinkel, 1928; Ramsey, 1930).
4 RΛ1 is a proper subset of E. For instance, if it contains the rewrite rule g(a) ≈ a it will not contain the superfluous rule
g(g(a)) ≈ g(a).
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3. Formal preliminaries
Most of the notions and notation we use in this paper are the standard ones in the field (see, e.g.,
Robinson and Voronkov (2001)). We report here only notable differences and additions.
3.1. Terms and substitutions
Wewill use two disjoint, infinite sets of variables: a set X of universal variables, whichwewill refer
to just as variables, and another set V , which we will always refer to as parameters. We will use u and
v to denote elements of V and x and y to denote elements of X . We fix a signatureΣ throughout the
paper, which is left implicit when we speak of terms, formulas, and interpretations. We assume that
Σ contains at least one constant symbol. If t is a term we denote by Var(t) the set of t ’s variables
and byP ar(t) the set of t ’s parameters. A term t is parameter-free iffP ar(t) = ∅, it is variable-free iff
Var(t) = ∅, and it is ground iffVar(t) = P ar(t) = ∅. A substitution ρ is a renaming onW ⊆ (V ∪ X)
iff its restriction toW is a bijection ofW onto itself; ρ is simply a renaming if it is a renaming on V ∪ X .
A substitution σ is p-preserving (short for parameter preserving) if it is a renaming on V . If s and t are
two terms, we write s & t , iff there is a substitution σ such that sσ = t .5 We say that s is a variant of
t , and write s ∼ t , iff s & t and t & s or, equivalently, iff there is a renaming ρ such that sρ = t . We
write s  t if s & t but s ≁ t . Wewrite s ≥ t and say that t is a p-instance of s iff there is a p-preserving
substitution σ such that sσ = t . We say that s is a p-variant of t , and write s ≃ t , iff s ≥ t and t ≥ s;
equivalently, iff there is a p-preserving renaming ρ such that sρ = t . The expression s[t]p denotes, as
usual, the term obtained from term s by replacing the subterm of s at position p by term t .
3.2. Clauses
Essentially without loss of generality, we assume that the signatureΣ contains only one predicate
symbol, ≈ (equality) although it may contain a finite set of function symbols of given arity; 0-ary
function symbols are called constants. Because equality is the only predicate symbol, an atom is always
a (positive) equation s ≈ t , where s and t are terms, which is identified with the multiset {s, t}.
Consequently, the equations s ≈ t and t ≈ s are the same. A literal is an atom, a positive literal, or the
negation of an atom, a negative literal. Negative literals are generally written s ≉ t instead of¬(s ≈ t).
We call a literal universal iff it is parameter-free. In particular, ground literals are universal. Non-
universal, or parametric, literals then contain at least one parameter.
In the examples below we often write non-equational literals like P(t1, . . . , tn) as an abbreviation
for the equational literal P(t1, . . . , tn) ≈ t, where t is a distinguished constant. We denote literals by
the letters K and L. We write L to denote the complement of a literal L, i.e., A = ¬A and ¬A = A, for
any atom A. We denote clauses by the letters C and D, and the empty clause by .
A clause is a parameter-free multiset of literals {L1, . . . , Ln}, generally written as a disjunction
L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln. We write L ∨ C to denote the clause {L} ∪ C . The empty clause is written as .
All the notions on substitutions above are extended from terms to atoms, literals and clauses in the
obvious way.
3.3. Orderings and rewrite systems
A reduction ordering is a well-founded partial ordering≻ on terms that is closed under context, i.e.,
s ≻ s′ implies t[s]p ≻ t[s′]p for all terms t and positions p, and liftable, i.e., s ≻ t implies sσ ≻ tσ for
every substitution σ .
We assume as given a reduction ordering ≻ that is total on ground terms and that the constant t
is the smallest ground term in this ordering. As usual, we will use ≽ to denote the reflexive closure
of≻.
5 Note that many authors would write s . t in this case.
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A (rewrite) rule is an expression of the form l → r where l and r are terms. A rewrite system is a
set of rewrite rules. We say that a rewrite system R is ordered by≻ iff l ≻ r , for every rule l → r ∈ R.
We will consider only ground rewrite systems ordered by ≻. A term t is reducible by l → r iff t = t[l]p
for some position p, and t is reducible wrt. R if it is reducible by some rule in R. Irreduciblemeans ‘‘not
reducible’’. A rewrite system R is left-reduced (fully reduced) iff for every rule l → r ∈ R, l is (l and r
are) irreducible wrt R \ {l → r}. In other words, in a fully reduced rewrite system no rule is reducible
by another rule, neither its left hand side nor its right hand side. A rewrite system is convergent iff it is
confluent and terminating.
3.4. Interpretations
A (Herbrand) interpretation I is a set of ground Σ-atoms—those meant to be true in the
interpretation. Satisfiability of first-order formulas in a Herbrand interpretation is defined as usual.
In particular, if F is a literal, a clause or a clause (set), we say that I satisfies F , or is a model of F ,
and write I |= F , if I satisfies every ground instance of (every element of) F . An E-interpretation
is an interpretation that is also a congruence relation on the ground terms. We say that F is E-
(un)satisfiable if it is satisfied by (no) E-interpretations. We say that F E-entails F ′, written F |=E F ′,
iff every E-interpretation that satisfies F also satisfies F ′. Since this is the only notion of entailment
considered in the paper, we will often write just F |= F ′. If I is an interpretation, we denote by I⋆
the congruence closure of I , i.e., the smallest congruence relation on all ground terms that includes
I , which is an E-interpretation. The above notions are applied to ground rewrite systems instead of
interpretations by considering their rewrite rules as equations. For instance, we write R⋆ |= F and
mean {l ≈ r | l → r ∈ R}⋆ |= F . It is well-known that every left-reduced (and hence also every
fully reduced) ground ordered rewrite system R is convergent and that any ground equation s ≈ t
is E-satisfied by R (i.e., R⋆ |= s ≈ t) if and only if s and t have the same (unique) normal form wrt.
R (Baader and Nipkow, 1998).
4. Contexts
TheModel Evolution calculus as presented in Baumgartner and Tinelli (2003) works with sequents
of the form Λ ⊢ Φ , where Λ is a finite set of literals possibly with variables or with parameters,
called a context, andΦ is a finite set of clauses possibly with variables. As in Baumgartner and Tinelli
(2003), we will consider for simplicity only contexts whose literals do not contain both parameters
and variables.6 In Baumgartner and Tinelli (2005) a contextΛ consisted of equational literals, and we
treatedΛ as if it contained the symmetric versions of each of its equations, negated or not. We depart
from that by working with rewrite literals now, which is simpler and more practical. More formally,
when l and r are terms, a rewrite literal is an expression of the form l → r or its negation ¬(l → r),
the latter generally written as l ↛ r . By treating→ as a predicate symbol, all operations defined on
equational literals apply to rewrite literals as well. For instance, l → r = l ↛ r and l ↛ r = l → r .
If clear from the context, we use the term ‘‘literal’’ to refer to equational literals as introduced earlier
or to rewrite literals.
Definition 4.1. A context is a set of the form {¬v} ∪ S where v ∈ V and S is a finite set of rewrite
literals, each of which is parameter-free or variable-free.
For brevity, we will omit writing the pseudo-literal ¬v in examples of contexts. For a context Λ, we
will denote withΛ≥ the set of all p-instances of the literals inΛ.
A literal L is contradictory with a context Λ iff Lσ ∈ Λ≥ for some p-preserving substitution σ . A
contextΛ is contradictory iff it contains a literal that is contradictory withΛ. We will work only with
non-contradictory contexts. Note thatmembership inΛ≥ is (efficiently) decidable for being reducible
to a syntactic unification problem overΛ. The same is true for contradiction withΛ.
6 In Baumgartner and Tinelli (2008) we have shown how this limitation can be overcome.
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Fig. 1. Contexts derivable by the calculus from the clauses (1), (2) and (3) in Section 2. The pseudo-literal ¬v, which goes into
the root node, is not written.
Example 4.2. If Λ = {f (u) → a, f (x) ↛ x} then f (v) → a, f (a) ↛ a ∈ Λ≥ but f (x) → a /∈ Λ≥,
Furthermore, f (v) ↛ a and f (a) → a are contradictory with Λ7 while f (a) ↛ a and a → f (a) are
not. 
We will also regularly return to our main example in Section 2 and use it to illustrate key ideas.
When we speak of clauses (1), (2) and (3) we mean those given there.
Example 4.3 (Main Example). TheME E calculus is based, essentially, on growing contexts and using
context literals for paramodulation and resolution type inferences. How the contexts grow exactly
will be explained below. Intuitively, unit clauses like (2) can be directly inserted into a context as
universal literals, whereas literals that share variables with other clause literals, like Q (x, a) ≈ t in
(1) are turned into parametric variants first and are subject to complementary splitting. As a result,
the context structure in Fig. 1 could evolve in a concrete derivation. 
Thanks to the notions introduced next, contexts can be used as finite denotations of (certain)
Herbrand interpretations.
Definition 4.4 (Productivity Baumgartner and Tinelli (2003)). Let L be a rewrite literal andΛ a context.
A rewrite literal K produces L in Λ iff (i) K & L8 and (ii) there is no K ′ ∈ Λ≥ such that K  K ′ & L.
The context Λ produces L iff some K ∈ Λ produces L in Λ. We say that K strongly produces L in Λ iff
K produces L in Λ but Λ does not produce L, and that Λ strongly produces L iff some K ∈ Λ strongly
produces L inΛ.
For instance, the context Λ in Example 4.2 produces f (a) ↛ b, as per ¬v ∈ Λ, and Λ produces
f (b)→ a but it does not produce f (a)→ a. InsteadΛ produces f (a) ↛ a as per f (a) ↛ a ∈ Λ≥.
Example 4.5 (Main Example). The ground literals produced by the contextΛ1 in Fig. 1 are Q (a, a)→
t, Q (f (a), a)→ t, Q (g(a), a)→ t,. . ., g(a)→ a, g(f (a))→ f (a), g(g(a))→ g(a), . . ., f (g(a))→ a,
f (g(f (a))) → f (a), f (g(g(a))) → g(a), . . .. Similarly for Λ2, which produces the literals in last
segment negated. 
The ground literals produced by a context serve as an approximation of a canonical interpretation
for the given clause set, as explained next.
7 The complement of the former is a p-instance of f (u)→ a, the complement of the latter is a p-instance of f (x) ↛ x.
8 In Baumgartner and Tinelli (2003) condition (i) is replaced by the stronger condition ‘‘K is an msg of L in Λ’’, where K is a
most specific generalization (msg) of L inΛ iff K & L and there is no K ′ ∈ Λ such that K  K ′ & L. Working with K & L alone is
somewhat simpler and achieves the same for all purposes.
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4.1. Model construction
In this section, we show how a context Λ induces a canonical E-interpretation represented by a
ground rewrite system RΛ. It is this ‘‘model construction’’ that, ultimately, justifies defining powerful
notions of redundancy for ME E and enables proving its completeness.9 It is a key component to
understand the working of the calculus and this is why we introduce it here already.
The general technique for defining RΛ is borrowed from the completeness proof of the
Superposition calculus (Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1998; Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 1995), but adapted
to our needs. One difference is thatME E requires the construction of a fully reduced rewrite system,
whereas for Superposition a left-reduced rewrite system is sufficient.10
Let Λ be a non-contradictory context. By identifying a rewrite rule l → r with the multiset {l, r}
and using themultiset extension of the term ordering≻, again denoted by≻ itself, we define by well-
founded induction, and with respect to Λ, sets of ground rewrite rules ϵK and RK , for every ground
rewrite rule K . Assume that ϵL has already been defined for all such Lwith K ≻ L and let RK =K≻L ϵL.
Then, ϵK is generally defined as follows.
ϵl→r =
{l → r} ifΛ produces l → r , l ≻ r , and l and r are irreducible wrt. Rl→r
∅ otherwise
When ϵl→r = {l → r}, we say that Λ generates l → r . Finally, the rewrite system associated with Λ
is the set
RΛ =

l→r
ϵl→r .
Example 4.6. Let Λ = {a → x, b → c, a ↛ c}. With a ≻ b ≻ c the associated rewrite system RΛ
is {b → c}. To see why, observe that the candidate rule a → c is not included in RΛ, as Λ does not
produce a → c , and that the other candidate a → b, although produced in Λ, is reducible by the
smaller rule b → c . Had we chosen to omit in the definition of ϵl→r the condition ‘‘r is irreducible
wrt. Rl→r ’’ 11 the construction would have given RΛ = {a → b, b → c}. This leads to the undesirable
situation that a constrained clause, say, a ≉ c · ∅ is falsified by R⋆Λ, the E-interpretation induced by RΛ.
But the calculus cannot modify Λ to revert this situation, and to detect the inconsistency (ordered)
paramodulation into variables would be needed. 
Example 4.7 (Main Example). Consider Fig. 1 again. ForΛ1 = {Q (v, a)→ t, g(x)→ x, f (g(v))→
v} the induced rewrite system, which must be a subset of its produced ground literals (see
Example 4.3), is
RΛ1 = {Q (a, a)→ t, Q (f (a), a)→ t, Q (f (f (a)), a)→ t, . . . ,
g(a)→ a, g(f (a))→ f (a), g(f (f (a)))→ f (f (a)), . . .} .
Notice that, e.g., g(g(a)) → g(a), although produced by Λ1 cannot be in RΛ1 because Rg(g(a))→g(a)
contains g(a) → a, which reduces g(g(a)) → g(a). It is straightforward to check that every ground
instance of the literal f (g(v)) → v in Λ1, which are all produced by Λ1 are all reducible by smaller
rules. In other words, f (g(v)) → v does not generate a single rule. The same applies to Λ2, as with
f (g(v)) ↛ v ∈ Λ2 no such instance is even produced. 
It is not difficult to see that RΛ is a fully reduced rewrite system. Since≻ is awell-founded ordering,
RΛ is convergent. It follows from standard results in term rewriting that the satisfaction of ground
literals s ≈ t (or s ≉ t) in R⋆Λ can be decided by checking if the normal forms of s and t wrt. RΛ are the
same.
9 The proof of soundness relies on different, and simpler, arguments.
10 Because of this difference, reflected also in the preconditions of the Sup-Pos rule defined later, one could argue that our
approach is more similar to ordered paramodulation (Nieuwenhuis and Rubio, 2001, e.g.) than to Superposition.
11 This condition is absent in themodel construction in the superposition calculus. Its presence explains why paramodulation
into smaller sides of positive split literals in clauses is necessary.
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Lemma 4.8. Let l and r be ground terms with l ≻ r.
(i) If l → r ∈ RΛ thenΛ produces l → r.
(ii) If l and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ thenΛ strongly produces l ↛ r.
The lemma above establishes an important relationship between ground rewrite literals produced
by Λ and the rewrite system RΛ. It connects membership in RΛ, a theoretical construction, with
productivity, a syntactical notion that can be readily used in inference rules. More technically, say
that l → r is a rule candidate if l ≻ r and both l and r are irreducible wrt. Rl→r . Then either the rule
candidate l → r is in RΛ and by Lemma 4.8(i) it is produced, or l → r is not in RΛ. In the latter case, as
l and r are irreducible wrt. Rl→r , it follows that l and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ.12 But then, Lemma 4.8
gives us thatΛ (strongly) produces l ↛ r . In other words, productivity approximatesmembership of
(possibly negated) rules in RΛ and it is precise for membership of (possibly negated) rule candidates
in RΛ.
5. Constrained clauses
A constraint is a finite multiset of pairs Γ = {K ′1 ◃ K1, . . . , K ′m ◃ Km}, where m ≥ 0 and for
i = 1, . . . ,m, K ′i is a rewrite literal, and Ki is a parameter-free rewrite literal with the same sign,
but is not of the form x → t , where x is a variable and t is a term. We will consider only constraints
where each K ′i is taken from a contextΛ, and we call K
′
i a context literal (of Γ ) and Ki a constraint literal
(ofΓ ). Intuitively, a pair K ′i ◃Ki is satisfied if K
′
i produces Ki inΛ, among other properties, as explained
below. For economy of notation we let Γ stand also for the multiset of its constraint literals (only),
and thus leave the context literals implicit. This allows us to write, e.g., l → r ∈ Γ instead of themore
verbose ‘‘K ′ ◃ l → r ∈ Γ , for some K ′’’. Whether Γ is taken this way or not will always be clear from
context. The application of a substitution σ to Γ , written as Γ σ , means to apply σ to each constraint
literal ofΓ (only), i.e.,Γ σ = {K ′1◃K1σ , . . . , K ′m◃Kmσ }. A constraint is ground iff each of its constraint
literals Ki is ground. A substitution γ is a grounding substitution for Γ iff Γ γ is ground.
Let C = L1∨· · ·∨Ln be a clause andΓ a constraint. The expression C ·Γ is a constrained clause (with
constraint Γ ). With the convention explained above, and dropping the set braces, we will often write
C ·K1, . . . , Km instead of C ·K ′1◃K1, . . . , K ′m◃Km, thus leaving the constraint’s context literals implicit.
The notation C ·Γ , K ′ ◃K means C ·Γ ∪ {K ′ ◃K}. Sometimes we write C ·Γ , K instead C ·Γ , K ′ ◃K ,
again leaving K ′ implicit. The application of a substitution σ to C · Γ , written as (C · Γ )σ , yields
the constrained clause (Cσ · Γ σ). A constrained clause C · Γ is ground iff both C and Γ are ground.
When C ·Γ is a constrained clause and γ is a grounding substitution for C ·Γ , i.e., a substitution with
domain Var(C) ∪ Var(Γ ) and whose range consists of ground terms, we call the pair (C · Γ , γ ) a
ground closure (of C · Γ ), or just closure (of C · Γ ). For a set of constrained clauses Φ , Φgr denotes the
set of all ground closures of all constrained clauses inΦ .
Constrained clauses are compared by associating to every constraint clause C · Γ the multiset of
multisets of terms
{{l, l, l, l, r, r, r, r} | l ≉ r ∈ C}
∪ {{l, l, l, r, r, r} | l ≈ r ∈ C}
∪ {{l, l, r, r} | l ↛ r ∈ Γ }
∪ {{l, r} | l → r ∈ Γ }
and then using the two-fold multiset extension of the term ordering ≻ on the associated multisets.
Again we use the symbol ≻ to denote this (strict) ordering on constrained clauses. It follows from
well-known results (see, e.g., Robinson and Voronkov (2001)) that ≻ is a well-founded ordering and
is total on ground constrained clauses. For instance, if a ≻ b then
a ≉ b · ∅ ≻ b ≉ b · a → b ≻  · a → b .
12 The only rules that could reduce l or r would have to be smaller or equal than l → r . The former case is excluded explicitly,
and the latter case is impossible because l → r /∈ RΛ .
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All inference rules on constrained clauses defined in Section 5.1 are order-decreasing at the ground
level.While different orderings exist that also satisfy this property, the particular definition above also
enables a certain redundancy concept based on reducible constraints, explained below.
To obtain a total and well-founded ordering on ground closures, we combine the ordering on
constrained clauses lexicographically with an arbitrary ordering ≻′ on ground closures that is total
(up to variable renaming),13 that is, we define (C · Γ , γ ) ≻ (C ′ · Γ ′, γ ′) iff (C · Γ )γ ≻ (C ′ · Γ ′)γ ′ or
(C · Γ )γ = (C ′ · Γ ′)γ ′ and (C · Γ , γ ) ≻′ (C ′ · Γ ′, γ ′).
To reason about the soundness of theME E calculus it is enough to treat each constrained clause
C · l1 → r1, . . . , lk → rk, lk+1 ↛ rk+1, . . . , ln ↛ rn
as the ordinary clause
C ∨ l1 ≉ r1 ∨ · · · ∨ lk ≉ rk ∨ lk+1 ≈ rk+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ln ≈ rn.
From a completeness perspective, however, a different reading of constrained clauses is appropriate.
The clause part C of a (ground) constrained clause C ·Γ is evaluated in an E-interpretation I , whereas
the literals in Γ are evaluated wrt. a context Λ in terms of productivity. The definitions below make
this precise.
A ground constraint Γ is ordered (wrt. ≻) iff l ≻ r for every l → r ∈ Γ and every l ↛ r ∈ Γ .
A non-ground constraint Γ is ordered (wrt. ≻) iff Γ γ is ordered, for some grounding substitution γ
for Γ .
Definition 5.1 (Satisfaction of Constraints). Let Λ be a context, Γ a constraint and γ a grounding
substitution for Γ . We say thatΛ satisfies the pair (Γ , γ ), and writeΛ |= (Γ , γ ), iff
(i) Γ γ is ordered, and
(ii) for every K ′ ◃ K ∈ Γ , K ′ produces both K and Kγ inΛ.
We say that Γ is satisfiable inΛ, or thatΛ satisfies Γ , written asΛ |= ∃Γ , iffΛ |= (Γ , γ ) for some γ .
Definition 5.2 (Satisfaction of Constrained Clauses). Let Λ be a context, I an E-interpretation, and
(C ·Γ , γ ) a ground closure.We say that the pair (Λ, I) satisfies (C ·Γ , γ ) andwrite (Λ, I) |= (C ·Γ , γ )
iffΛ |̸= (Γ , γ ) or I |= Cγ .
The pair (Λ, I) satisfies a possibly non-ground constrained clause (set) F , written as (Λ, I) |= F iff
(Λ, I) satisfies all ground closures of (all elements in) F . For a set of constrained clauses Φ and C · Γ
a (possibly non-ground) constrained clause, we say that Φ entails C · Γ , and write Φ |= C · Γ iff for
every (Λ, I)we have (Λ, I) |̸= Φ or (Λ, I) |= (C · Γ ).
The definitions above also apply to pairs (Λ, R), where R is a rewrite system, by implicitly taking
(Λ, R⋆). In the main applications of Definition 5.2 such a rewrite system R will be determined by the
model construction in Section 4.1 above.
Example 5.3. Let
Λ = {f (x)→ x, f (c) ↛ c} γa = {x → a},
R = {f (a)→ a, f (b)→ b}, γb = {x → b},
C · Γ = f (f (a)) ≈ x · f (x)→ x ◃ f (x)→ x γc = {x → c} .
Suppose that a ≻ b ≻ c and observe that Γ γa, Γ γb and Γ γc are ordered. Then, Λ |= (Γ , γa), as
f (x) → x produces both f (x) → x and f (a) → a in Λ, and so we need to check R⋆ |= f (f (a)) ≈ a,
which is the case, to conclude (Λ, R) |= (C · Γ , γa). As Λ |= (Γ , γb) but R⋆ |̸= f (f (a)) ≈ b we have
(Λ, R) |̸= (C · Γ , γb). Finally, f (x) → x does not produce f (c) → c in Λ, and with Λ |̸= (Γ , γc) it
follows (Λ, R) |= (C · Γ , γc) 
13 Since for every ground closure (C ·Γ , γ ) there are only finitely many closures (C ′ ·Γ ′, γ ′) such that (C ·Γ )γ = (C ′ ·Γ ′)γ ′ ,
the lexicographic combination is well-founded even if≻′ is not well-founded.
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Example 5.4 (Main Example). Clause (1) in Fig. 1 can be written as the constrained clause C · Γ =
Q (x, a) ≈ t ∨ P(f (x)) ≈ t · ∅ by attaching an empty constraint, and analogously for (2) and (3). Let
γ = {x → g(g(f (a)))}. As Γ = ∅, to check that (Λ1, RΛ1) satisfies (C · Γ , γ ) we only need to check
that RΛ1 |= Q (g(g(f (a))), a) ≈ t ∨ P(f (g(g(f (a))))) ≈ t. Indeed, by using the second part of the
rewrite rules in RΛ1 , as shown in Example 4.7, we obtain first Q (f (a), a) ≈ t ∨ P(f (f (a))) ≈ t and
then t ≈ t ∨ P(f (f (a))) ≈ t, which is trivially satisfied in RΛ1 . In fact, this holds for every ground
closure of C · Γ , and so C · Γ is already satisfied in RΛ1 . As a consequence, the calculus does not need
to work on modifyingΛ1 to become a model of C · Γ .
By contrast, RΛ3 does not satisfy any ground closure of C · Γ . Notice that RΛ3 = ∅, and hence for
every ground closure (C ·Γ , γ ) the clause Cγ is irreducible wrt. RΛ3 . By Lemma 4.8 thenΛ3 produces
the complement of every literal in Cγ , a situation the calculus can detect and make progress on by
splitting.
Now let C · Γ = f (g(x)) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · ∅ be the constrained clause version of clause (2).
By taking, e.g., γ = {x → a} one sees that (Λ1, RΛ1) does not satisfy (C · Γ , γ ). More explicitly,
RΛ1 |̸= f (g(a)) ≈ a∨ h(a) ≈ a because the normal form f (a) ≈ a∨ h(a) ≈ a of Cγ wrt. RΛ1 does not
contain a trivial equation of the form t ≈ t . On the other hand, the calculus can reflect this normal
form computation at the first-order level by a superposition step from the rewrite literal g(x) → x
taken fromΛ1 into clause (2), which gives the constrained clause
C ′ · Γ ′ = f (x) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · g(x)→ x ◃ g(x)→ x . (13)
Observe that (C ′ ·Γ ′, {x → a}) is still not satisfied by (Λ1, RΛ1) asΛ |= ({g(x)→ x◃g(x)→ x}, {x →
a}) but RΛ1 |̸= f (a) ≈ a ∨ h(a) ≈ a. Progress has been made though, as (C ′ · Γ ′, {x → a}) is smaller
wrt.≻ than (C · Γ , {x → a}). As will be explained below in Example 6.2, the calculus will make sure,
by extendingΛ1 with, say, f (v)→ v, that f (a)→ a will go into the induced rewrite system, so that
the considered ground closure will be satisfied afterward. 
In summary, themain idea of the calculus is to (i) identify, at the first-order level, ground closureswhose
(instantiated) clause part is normalized with respect to the rewrite system induced by the current context,
and, (ii) modify the context as needed so that the new context and its induced rewrite system satisfy one
of the previously falsified clauses.
It follows from the above that the (instantiated) constraints of these ground closures are always
satisfied in terms of Definition 5.5. This leads immediately to the definition of relevant closures
introduced below, which are the only ones the calculus needs to consider satisfying.
Definition 5.5 (Satisfaction of Constraints wrt. Rewrite Systems). LetΓ be a ground constraint.We say
that RΛ satisfies Γ , and write RΛ |= Γ , iff
(i) l → r ∈ RΛ for all l → r ∈ Γ , and
(ii) l and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ for all l ↛ r ∈ Γ .
Note 5.6. The previous definition can be understood to evaluate a set Γ of (possibly negated) rule
candidates wrt. a set of rewrite rules: RΛ satisfies a ground constraint Γ if and only if l → r is a rule
candidate, for every l → r ∈ Γ or l ↛ r ∈ Γ , and in the former case l → r is included in RΛ because
Λ produces l → r , and in the latter case l → r is not included in RΛ only becauseΛ does not produce
l → r . As a consequence, if Λ is modified such that it produces l → r , it will no longer satisfy Γ .
Example 6.2 below demonstrates the relevance of these properties. 
By combining Definition 5.5 and Lemma 4.8, we immediately conclude that Λ produces every
rewrite literal in a ground constraint Γ if RΛ |= Γ . The relevance of this result is that for relevant
closures the syntactic notion of productivity can be used to identify relevant constrained clauses C ·Γ
that are falsified by (Λ, RΛ), as introduced next.
Definition 5.7 (Relevant Closure wrt.Λ). LetΛ be a context and (C · Γ , γ ) a ground closure. We say
that (C · Γ , γ ) is a relevant (ground) closure wrt.Λ iff RΛ |= Γ γ .
Note that, by definition, all ground closures of a clause with an empty constraint are relevant. Also
note that for C · Γ to have relevant closures it does not have to belong to a specific clause set.
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Example 5.8. Assume constants a, b and c with a ≻ b. Let Λ = {P(x) → t, a → b, P(b) ↛ t},
which results in RΛ = {P(c) → t, a → b}. (Notice that P(a) → t /∈ RΛ as P(a) → t is
reducible by the smaller rule a → b, and P(b) → t /∈ RΛ as Λ does not produce P(b) → t.) If
C · Γ = x ≈ c · P(x) → t ◃ P(x) → t, the substitution γ = {x → a} gives a non-relevant ground
closure (C · Γ , γ ), as P(a)→ t /∈ RΛ, and likewise for γ = {x → b}. With γ = {x → c} the ground
closure (C ·Γ , γ ) is relevant, and it follows (Λ, RΛ) |= (C ·Γ , γ ), as RΛ trivially satisfies Cγ = c ≈ c
(cf. Definition 5.2). 
5.1. Inference rules on constrained clauses
In the following, we introduce a number of superposition-style inference rules on rewrite literals
and constrained clauses that will be used for defining the derivation rules ofME E. The inference rules
assume a selection function that maps a constrained clause C · Γ with non-empty C to a non-empty
subset of the literals in C , the selected literals (in C · Γ ).14
Ref
s ≉ t ∨ C · Γ
(C · Γ )σ
where (i) σ is a most general unifier (mgu) of s and t , (ii) s ≉ t is selected in s ≉ t ∨C ·Γ , and (iii) Γ σ
is ordered.
The next three rules combine a rewrite literal and a constrained clause. Within theME E calculus,
which operates on sequents consisting of a context and constrained clause set, the rewrite literal will
come from the current context and the clause from the current constrained clause set.
Sup-Neg
l → r s[l′]p ≉ t ∨ C · Γ
(s[r]p ≉ t ∨ C · Γ , l → r ◃ l → r)σ
where (i) l → r is a rewrite literal, (ii) σ is a mgu of l and l′, (iii) l′ is not a variable, (iv) rσ ⋡ lσ ,
(v) tσ ⋡ sσ , (vi) s ≉ t is selected in s ≉ t ∨ C · Γ , and (vii) Γ σ is ordered.
Recall that substitutions are not applied to a constraint’s context literals. The conclusion of the
above inference rule could equally be written as (s[r]p ≉ t ∨ C)σ · Γ σ , l → r ◃ (l → r)σ .
Sup-Pos
l → r s[l′]p ≈ t ∨ C · Γ
(s[r]p ≈ t ∨ C · Γ , l → r ◃ l → r)σ
where (i) l → r is a rewrite literal, (ii) σ is a mgu of l and l′, (iii) l′ is not a variable, (iv) rσ ⋡ lσ ,
(v) s ≈ t is selected in s ≈ t ∨ C · Γ , and (vi) Γ σ is ordered.15
Example 5.9 (Main Example). Sup-Pos can be applied to g(x)→ x (from Λ1 in Fig. 1) and clause (3)
in the following way:
Sup-Pos
g(x)→ x f (g(x)) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · ∅
f (x) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · g(x)→ x
(14)
We refer back to Example 5.4 which explained the purpose of such superposition steps. Notice the
conclusion of this inference is the clause (13) given there. 
14 Selection functions on negative literals are a well-known device in the superposition calculus. InME E , we can be more
liberal and select any literal(s) in C , which results in more stringent selection functions.
15 Technically, and differently from Sup-Neg, since it can apply to both sides of an equation Sup-Pos is an ordered
paramodulation rule, not a superposition one.
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The rulesSup-Pos andSup-Neg are the only ones that create newpositive rewrite literals (l → r)σ
in the constraint part. It is possible in both cases that the left premise is of the form x → t (x → t
might stem from a clause literal x ≈ t), but because l′ is not a variable, lσ is not a variable either. Thus,
adding to Γ σ the rewrite literal (l → r)σ preserves the property of being a constraint (recall that
constraints cannot contain rewrite literals of the form x → t). As an easy inductive consequence all
expressions C · Γ derivable by the calculus are indeed constrained clauses.
Neg-Res
¬A s ≈ t ∨ C · Γ
(C · Γ ,¬A ◃ s ↛ t)σ
where (i)¬A is the pseudo-literal¬v or a negative rewrite literal l ↛ r , (ii) σ is a mgu of A and s → t ,
(iii) tσ ⋡ sσ , (iv) s ≈ t is selected in s ≈ t ∨ C · Γ , and (v) Γ σ is ordered.
Example 5.10 (Main Example). Continuing Example 5.9, by two-fold application of Neg-Reswith left
premise¬v one obtains from clause (13) the clause
 · g(x)→ x, f (x) ↛ x, h(x) ↛ x . (15)
Recall from Example 5.4 the closure ((13), {x → a}) whose clause part instantiated by {x → a}
is already normalized wrt. RΛ1 , yet falsified by RΛ1 . Clause (15) then serves to enable repairing this
situation by a Split inference, as will be demonstrated in Example 6.2 below. 
In the Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and Neg-Res rules we implicitly assume that the conclusion is parameter-
free. That can always be achieved by renaming parameters in the conclusion to fresh variables or by
taking parameter-free variants of the left premise.We also assume that the two premises are variable-
disjoint, which can be achieved by taking a fresh variant of the, say, right premise.
An inference system ι is a set of inference rules. By an ι-inferencewemean an instance of an inference
rule from ι such that the conditions stated with that rule are satisfied. An inference is ground if all its
premises and the conclusion are ground.
The base inference system ιBase consists of Ref, Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and Neg-Res. If a ground ιBase-
inference results from a given ιBase-inference by applying a substitution γ to all premises and the
conclusion, we call the resulting ground inference a ground instance via γ (of the ιBase-inference). This
is not always the case, as, e.g., ordering constraints can become unsatisfiable after application of γ .
An important consequence of the ordering restrictions for the inference rules is that the conclusion
of a ground ιBase inference is always strictly smaller than the rightmost premise.
6. TheME E calculus
In this section we describe the ME E calculus, starting with its basic derivation rules. Then we
define amodel constructionmechanism thatwill allow us to associatewith each context a convergent
rewrite system. On top of that, we then define concepts of redundancy and relevance, which together
are the main tools to explain the calculus’ completeness. Finally, we introduce certain optional
derivation rules, which are important for practical efficiency.
6.1. Basic derivation rules
We now introduce the basic set of derivation rules that define theME E calculus. The rules operate
on sequents, pairs of the form Λ ⊢ Φ where Λ is a context and Φ is a set of constrained clauses. In
the rules, we use the notationΛ, K ⊢ Φ, C as an abbreviation ofΛ ∪ {K} ⊢ Φ ∪ {C}.
The first rule of the calculus extends the inference rules ιBase from Section 5.1 to sequents.
Deduce
Λ ⊢ Φ
Λ ⊢ Φ, C · Γ
if one of the following cases applies:
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• C · Γ is the conclusion of a Ref inference with a premise fromΦ .
• C · Γ is the conclusion of a Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos or Neg-Res inference with a right premise from Φ
and a left premise K ∈ Λ that produces Kσ inΛ, where σ is the mgu used in that inference.
The (pseudo) literal K is the selected rewrite literal (of a Deduce inference).
In all cases above, the rightmost premise of the ιBase inference rules applied by Deduce is called the
selected clause.
Example 6.1 (Main Example). Consider again the context Λ1 in Fig. 1 and the sequent Λ1 ⊢ (1),
(2), (3). Starting with clause (3), by three Deduce inferences with underlying Sup-Pos and Neg-Res
inferences one obtains a sequent containing clause (15). 
The intuition behind the next rule, Split, is to make a constrained empty clause ·Γ true, which is
false whenΛ satisfiesΓ (in the sense of Definition 5.2). In this sense, the current context is ‘‘repaired’’
toward a model for a constrained empty clause. But as Λ is only an approximation of the intended
interpretation, the repair mechanism will sometimes overshoot, yet it will cover all relevant cases
(Lemma 4.8). The Split rule comes in two variants, depending on whether the chosen literal from Γ
satisfies a certain variable-disjointness condition or not.
U-Split
Λ ⊢ Φ,  · K ,Γ
Λ, K ⊢ Φ,  · K ,Γ Λ ⊢ Φ,  · Γ
if (i) K is variable-disjoint with Γ (i.e., Var(K) ∩ Var(Γ ) = ∅), and (ii) K is not contradictory with
Λ.
The literal K is the split literal (of the U-Split inference).
Because constraints are parameter-free, the split literal is parameter-free, too. Intuitively, U-Split
can be understood to make the selected clause redundant in the left conclusion,16 and in the right
conclusion its constraint is shortened by (the complement of) the split literal. The case of Γ = ∅ is
permissible; then, the clause set in the right conclusion will contain the constrained empty clause
 · ∅.
For example, U-Split applied to  · ¬v ◃ P(x, a) ↛ t,¬v ◃ Q (y) ↛ t and Λ = ∅ gives the
context {P(x, a) → t} in the left conclusion, this way preventing ¬v from producing P(x, a) ↛ t in
{P(x, a)→ t}. In the right conclusion the derived clause is  · ¬v ◃ Q (y) ↛ t and the context is still
∅.
P-Split
Λ ⊢ Φ
Λ, L ⊢ Φ Λ, L ⊢ Φ
if there is a constrained clause  · K ,Γ ∈ Φ such that (i) K is not variable-disjoint with Γ , (ii) L is a
variable-free variant of K , and (iii) neither L nor L is contradictory withΛ.
The literal L is the split literal (of the P-Split inference).
For instance, in contrast to the just given example, P-Split applied to  · ¬v ◃ P(x, a) ↛ t,¬v ◃
Q (x) ↛ t andΛ = ∅ gives the contexts {P(v, a)→ t} in the left conclusion and {P(v, a) ↛ t} in the
right conclusion. Observe that P-Split no longer applies with the same literal, neither to the left-hand
nor to the right-hand conclusion.
We will refer to either of the two rules above as a Split rule and call the clause  · K ,Γ the selected
clause (of the Split-inference).
Example 6.2 (Main Example). Recall clause (15),
 · g(x)→ x, f (x) ↛ x, h(x) ↛ x , (15)
16 So that it can be deleted in derivations by using the Simp rule, introduced below.
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Fig. 2. Context structure from Fig. 1 after split.
which was obtained from clause (3),
f (g(x)) ≈ x ∨ h(x) ≈ x · ∅ (3)
by application of three Deduce inferences in the context of Λ1, cf. Example 6.1. Let Λ1 ⊢
(1), (2), (3), . . . , (15) be the resulting sequent. Now P-Split is applicable with selected clause (15),
where the split literal is either f (v)→ v or g(v)→ v. Let us chose f (v)→ v. The resulting context
structure is visualized in Fig. 2.
Extending Λ1 with f (v) → v to obtain Λ4 has the effect that the rule f (a) → a is added to the
induced rewrite system, hence all ground terms collapse to a. More explicitly,
RΛ4 = {Q (a, a)→ t, g(a)→ a, f (a)→ a} .
As emphasized at the end of Example 5.4, the main idea of the calculus is to identify ground
closures that are normalized in their (instantiated) clause part, and to satisfy them. In the example,
(Λ1, RΛ1) falsifies the ground closure ((3), {x → a}) but considers its (falsified) normalized version
((15), {x → a}) =: ( · Γ , γ ) instead. As a consequence of this normalization every positive rewrite
literal in Γ γ , i.e., g(a)→ a, must be a rule in RΛ1 , and every negative literal in Γ γ , i.e., f (a) ↛ a and
h(a) ↛ a, must be irreducible wrt. RΛ1 , the latter because otherwise they would stem from a ground
closure with non-normalized (instantiated) clause part.
In other words, ( · Γ , γ ) is a relevant closure wrt. RΛ1 . The Split application above that led to
Λ4 achieves that f (a) → a is produced in Λ4, hence by Note 5.6 we get f (a) → a ∈ RΛ4 , and so
((15), {x → a}) is satisfied by (Λ4, RΛ4), and also ((15), {x → a}) is not relevant wrt.Λ4. 
Notice that a Split inference can never add an oriented literal to a context that already contains a
variant of it or its complement, as this would contradict condition (ii) of U-Split and corresponding
condition (iii) of P-Split.17
Close
Λ ⊢ Φ, · Γ
Λ ⊢ Φ, · ∅
if for every K ∈ Γ there is a L ∈ Λ≥ such that K & L if K is variable-disjoint with Γ \ K and K ∼ L
otherwise.
The constrained clause  · Γ is the selected clause (of the Close inference).
17 The Deduce rule could be strengthened to exclude adding variants to the clauses sets in the conclusion. We ignore this
(trivial) aspect.
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In terms of standard notions, the condition in the Close rule is equivalent to have that for every
literal K ∈ Γ , if (a) K does not share variables with other literals in Γ then K can be instantiated to
a parametric context literal in Λ or K is unifiable with a (fresh variant of a) universal literal in Λ, or
else (b) K is a variant of a parametric context literal inΛ or K is an instance of a universal literal inΛ.
TheME E calculus consists of the mandatory inference rules Deduce, U-Split, P-Split and Close. By
an ME E inference we mean an instance of any of these inference rules. Below we will add optional
inference rules to theME E calculus.
6.2. Redundancy
From a completeness perspective it is sufficient to workwith a sufficiently developed limit context
ΛB of a derivation, formally introduced below, and check that all relevant closureswrt.ΛB are satisfied
by the pair (ΛB, RΛB). It would be useful to define clauses as redundant if they are satisfied by
(ΛB, RΛB). However, this is difficult to check asΛB, and hence its induced rewrite system, is generally
not known at any (finite) point in the derivation. The calculus’ notions of redundancy introduced
below can therefore work only approximatively wrt. satisfaction in (ΛB, RΛB). In addition, they need
to be robust under changes of contexts. For instance, to justify deleting a clause that is redundant at
one point in the derivation it must be made sure that this clause remains redundant, independently
from how the contexts and clause sets evolve.
To introduce our notion of redundancy we need one more prerequisite: we say that a ground
constraint Γ is reducible by a ground rule l → r iff one of the following two cases applies:
(i) there is a s → t ∈ Γ with s → t ≻ l → r such that s or t is reducible by l → r , or
(ii) there is a s ↛ t ∈ Γ such that s or t is reducible by l → r .
It is not difficult to see that a ground closure (C · Γ , γ ) cannot be a relevant closure wrt. Λ if the
constraintΓ γ is reducible by a rule in RΛ. This fact is exploited to justify a specific case of redundancy,
the second part in item (iii) in the following definition.
Definition 6.3 (Redundancy). LetΛ ⊢ Φ be a sequent, andD and (C ·Γ , γ ) ground closures.We say
that (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ andD , if Λ |̸= (Γ , γ ) or there exist n ≥ 0 ground closures
(Ci · Γi, γi) of constrained clauses Ci · Γi ∈ Φ , with i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(i) if L′ ◃ L ∈ Γi then there exists a K ′ ◃ K ∈ Γ such that L′ ∼ K ′, L ∼ K and Lγi = Kγ ,
(ii) D ≻ (Ci · Γi, γi), for every i, and
(iii) C1γ1, . . . , Cnγn |= Cγ or C1γ1, . . . , Cnγn |= l ≈ r for some ground terms l and r with l ≻ r and
such that Γ γ is reducible by l → r .
We say that (C ·Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ , iff (C ·Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ and (C ·Γ , γ ),
andwe say that C ·Γ is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ iff every ground closure (C ·Γ , γ ) of C ·Γ is redundant
wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ .
Intuitively, condition (i) ensures that if the given closure (C ·Γ , γ ) is relevantwrt. a rewrite system
RΛ andΛ satisfies (Γ , γ ) (cf. Definition 5.1) then the same holds for each ground closure (Γi · Ci, γi)
used to establish the redundancy. Condition (ii) makes sure that only ground closures smaller than the
given closureD are used. Condition (iii) then adds sufficient conditions so that satisfaction in terms
of Definition 5.2 is preserved or that (C · Γ , γ ) is irrelevant because Γ γ is not satisfied by RΛ.
Referring to the notion of derivation trees formally defined in Section 7 below, it can be shown
that a constrained clause that is redundant at some node of the derivation tree will remain redundant
in all successor nodes. Consequently, a redundant clause can be deleted from a clause set without
endangering refutational completeness.
A practically useful case of redundancy is when Λ |̸= ∃Γ holds, say, because Γ contains an
element K ′ ◃ K such that K ′ does not produce K in Λ, as then C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ ,
for every C and Φ . Another useful case is when a constraint literal in a constrained clause can be
demodulated by an orientable positive unit clause, which justifies the deletion of the clause. For
instance C · Γ , P(f (a))→ t, can be deleted in presence of f (x) ≈ x · ∅. In our running example:
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Example 6.4 (Main Example). Let  · Γ = (15) as discussed in Example 6.2 above. With γ ′ = {x →
g(a)} we get Γ γ ′ = {g(g(a)) → g(a), f (g(a)) ↛ g(a), h(g(a)) ↛ g(a)} and Condition (iii) applies
to make ( · Γ , γ ′) redundant (take the ground closure (g(x) ≈ x · ∅, {x → a}) to check that Γ γ ′ is
reducible by g(a)→ a). This is justified as ( · Γ , γ ′) is not relevant wrt.Λ1, and hence need not be
considered. 
Any constrained clause C · L,Γ is redundant wrt. every Λ ⊢ Φ such that C · Γ ∈ Φ . If L ∈ Λ≥
then the clausal form of C ·Γ is a consequence of the clausal form of C · L,Γ , and the Simp rule below
then can be used to simplify C · L,Γ to C · Γ . Dually, if L ∈ Λ≥ then L cannot be produced in Λ, it
followsΛ |̸= ∃ L,Γ and so C · L,Γ is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ , for every C andΦ . These considerations
show that ME E generalizes corresponding simplification rules by unit clauses in the propositional
DPLL-procedure.
Also, a constrained clause C ·Γ ′ is redundantwrt. any sequent containing a constrained clause C ·Γ
such that Γ ⊂ Γ ′.
Definition 6.5 (RedundantME E Inference). LetΛ ⊢ Φ andΛ′ ⊢ Φ ′ be sequents. AnME E inference
with premiseΛ ⊢ Φ and selected clause C ·Γ ∈ Φ is redundant wrt.Λ′ ⊢ Φ ′ iff for every grounding
substitution γ , (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt. Λ′ ⊢ Φ ′, or the following holds, depending on the
inference rule applied:
Deduce: applying γ to all premises and the conclusion C ′ · Γ ′ of the underlying ιBase inference does
not result in a ground instance via γ of this ιBase inference, or (C ′ · Γ ′, γ ) is redundant wrt.
Λ′ ⊢ Φ ′ and (C · Γ )γ .
Split: C · Γ =  · Γ and there is a K ′ ◃ K ∈ Γ such that K ′ does not produce K inΛ′, or, in case of
P-Split, the split literal of the inference is contradictory withΛ′.
Close: C · Γ =  · ∅ ∈ Φ ′.
It is not too difficult to see that actually carrying out an inferencemakes it redundantwrt. the resulting
sequent(s). ForSplit, in particular, the condition ‘‘there is a literal K ∈ Γ such thatΛ′ does not produce
K ’’ achieves that for the left sequent in the conclusion, bymeans of adding the split literal toΛ; for the
right sequent, in the P-Split case, that is achieved by the condition ‘‘the split literal of the inference is
contradictory withΛ′’’, and in the U-Split case the selected clause becomes redundant because of the
new (shortened) clause.With a view to implementation, this indicates that effective proof procedures
forME E indeed exist.
Finally, a sequentΛ ⊢ Φ is saturated iff everyME E inference with premiseΛ ⊢ Φ is redundant
wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ .
6.3. Static completeness
The calculus derives, possibly in the limit, a saturated sequent Λ ⊢ Φ , and the rewrite system
R⋆Λ induced from that limit context Λ satisfies all ordinary clauses in Φ , i.e., R
⋆
Λ |= {C | C · ∅},
unlessΦ contains the empty constrained clause with empty constraint,  · ∅. Note that the saturated
sequent is not necessarily such that (Λ, RΛ) |= Φ . Intuitively, the evaluation of constraints according
to Definition 5.1 is too strong to obtain (Λ, RΛ) |= Φ in general: given a saturated sequent Λ ⊢ Φ
and a ground closure (C · Γ , γ ) for some C · Γ ∈ Φ we might have Λ |= (Γ , γ ) but RΛ |̸= Cγ , and
the calculus cannot detect this situation (see the statement of Theorem 6.6 for an example). However,
(Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ) does hold for all relevant ground closures (C · Γ , γ ) of all constrained clauses
in C · Γ ∈ Φ .
Theorem 6.6 (Static Completeness). If Λ ⊢ Φ is a saturated sequent with a non-contradictory context
Λ and·∅ /∈ Φ then (Λ, RΛ) satisfies all relevant instances of all clauses inΦ wrt.Λ , i.e., (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ.
Moreover, if Ψ is a clause set andΦ includes Ψ , i.e., {D · ∅ | D ∈ Ψ } ⊆ Φ , then R⋆Λ |= Ψ .
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The stronger statement (Λ, RΛ) |= Φ does in general not follow, as (Λ, RΛ) possibly falsifies a non-
relevant closure of a constrained clause inΦ . An example is the sequent (with a ≻ b)
Λ ⊢ Φ = P(u)→ t, a → b, P(b) ↛ t ⊢ P(x) · P(x)→ t ◃ P(x)→ t .
We get RΛ = {a → b}. By taking γ = {x → a} observe that Λ |= (P(x) → t ◃ P(x) → t, γ ) but
R⋆Λ |̸= P(x)γ , hence (Λ, RΛ) |̸= P(x) · P(x) → t ◃ P(x) → t. Deriving  · ¬v ◃ P(x) ↛ t, P(x) →
t ◃ P(x) → t does not help to close Λ. But notice that P(x)γ = P(a) is reducible wrt. RΛ, and so
(P(x) · P(x)→ t ◃ P(x)→ t, γ ) is not a relevant closure wrt.Λ, and Theorem 6.6 is not violated.
Theorem6.6 applies to a statically given sequentΛ ⊢ Φ . The connection to the dynamic derivation
process of theME E calculus will be given later, and Theorem 6.6 will be essential then in proving the
completeness of theME E calculus.
6.4. Optional derivation rules
The calculus can be enhanced with a few optional and rather general derivation rules. Suitable
specializations of these rules are useful in producing efficient implementations ofME E. Some of these
rules refer to the clausal form of a constrained clause C · Γ = C · l1 → r1, . . . , lk → rk, lk+1 ↛
rk+1, . . . , ln ↛ rn, defined as the ordinary clause C∨ l1 ≉ r1∨· · ·∨ lk ≉ rk∨ lk+1 ≈ rk+1∨· · ·∨ ln ≈ rn
and denoted by (C ·Γ )c—note that the constraint’s context literals are ignored in the clausal form.We
define the clausal form of a setΦ = {Ci · Γi}i of constrained clauses as the setΦc = {(Ci · Γi)c}i.
For the rest of the paper we fix a constant a from the signature Σ and the substitution α :=
{v → a | v ∈ V } that maps each parameter to a.18 For each literal L, we denote by La the literal
Lα. Note that La is ground if, and only if, L is variable-free. For each contextΛwe will consider the set
Λa = {(l ≈ r)a | l → r ∈ Λ} ∪ {(l ≉ r)a | l ↛ r ∈ Λ} and treat it as a set of unit clauses.
The first optional derivation rule, Compact simplifies a context by removing a superfluous literal.
Compact
Λ, L ⊢ Φ
Λ ⊢ Φ
if L ∈ Λ≥ (i.e., if there is a literal K ∈ Λ such that K ≥ L).
The Compact rule is the only rule that can remove literals from a context. It is easy to see that
any literal produced by L in Λ is also produced by K in Λ, provided Λ is non-contradictory. Notice
that K must be a universal literal, otherwise Λ ∪ {L} would contain two p-variants of the same
(parametric) literal, which is impossible by construction of Λ ∪ {L}. This means that it is possible,
althoughnotmandatory, to removewith eachCompact inference all occurrences of L in the constraints
in the clauses in Φ . See the discussion under Simplification by Context Literals further below for the
justification.
Like DPLL, theME calculus includes an optional derivation rule, calledAssert, to insert a literal into
a context without causing branching. InME this rule bears close resemblance to the unit-resulting
resolution rule. Here we propose the rather general rule Assert rule, defined below.
Assert
Λ ⊢ Φ
Λ, L ⊢ Φ
if (i)Λa ∪ Φc |= La, (ii) L is non-contradictory withΛ, and (iii) L /∈ Λ≥.
As an example, Assert is applicable to the sequent ¬v, P(u, b)→ t, b → c ⊢ ¬P(x, y) ∨ f (x) ≈
y · ∅ to yield the new context literal f (u)→ c , as {P(a, b), b ≈ c, ¬P(x, y) ∨ f (x) ≈ y} |= f (a) ≈ c.
The third condition of Assert avoids the introduction of superfluous literals in the context. The
first condition is needed for soundness. It is not decidable in its full generality and so can only be
approximated with an incomplete test. This, however, is not a problem given that Assert is optional.
18 Strictly speaking, α is not a substitution in the standard sense because its domain is not finite. But this will cause no
problems here.
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To make derivation in ME E practical the redundancy criteria defined in Section 6.2 should be
made available not only to avoid redundant inferences, but also to simplify constrained clauses or
delete redundant clauses. Instead of attempting to define individual derivation rules covering specific
situations we provide a generic simplification rule Simp and discuss some of its instantiations.
Simp
Λ ⊢ Φ, C · Γ
Λ ⊢ Φ, C ′ · Γ ′
if (i) C · Γ is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ, C ′ · Γ ′, and (ii)Λa ∪ Φc ∪ (C · Γ )c |= (C ′ · Γ ′)c.
Condition (ii) is needed for soundness.
Trivial equations. Any constrained clause C ·Γ of the form s ≈ s∨D ·Γ can be simplified to t ≈ t · ∅.
Such a simplification step has the same effect as if C · Γ were deleted. Dually, any constrained clause
C · Γ of the form s ≉ s ∨ D · Γ can be simplified to D · Γ .
Proper subsumption. The Simp rule also enables deletion of a constrained clause that is properly
subsumed by another one. More formally, we say that C ′ · Γ ′ properly subsumes C · Γ iff there is a
substitution σ such that C ′σ ⊂ C and Γ ′σ ⊆ Γ , or C ′σ ⊆ C and Γ ′σ ⊂ Γ .
Simplification by context literals. Another practically relevant application of Simp corresponds to
applications of the unit resolution rule, both into the clause part and into the constraint part of a
constrained clause. Regarding the former, suppose a context Λ, K ⊢ Φ, C ∨ L · Γ where K is a
universal rewrite literal, taken as an equational literal, and suppose there is amgu of K and L such that
(C ·Γ )σ = C ·Γ . Because K is parameter-free it follows that (Λ ∪ {K})a ∪ {(C∨L·Γ )c} |= ((C ·Γ )σ )c.
Together with (C · Γ )σ = C · Γ , this implies that the clause C ∨ L · Γ can thus be simplified to C · Γ .
Dually, if there is a mgu of K and L such that (C ∨ L · Γ )σ = C ∨ L · Γ then (C ∨ L · Γ ) can be deleted.
Even parametric context literals can be used for certain simplifications: in a sequent Λ ⊢ φ a
clause of the form C ·Γ , K◃L ∈ Φ can be deleted fromΦ in particular if there is a (possibly parametric)
literal K ′ ∈ Λ≥ such that K  K ′ & L. Observe that this situation always comes up in the left context
after a P-Split application. Consequently, in the left context the clause can again be deleted. However,
in the right context the clause cannot be simplified as for U-Split above, such a simplification step
would not be justified. For example,  · P(x) → t,Q (x) → t cannot be simplified by means of a
context literal P(u) → t to  · Q (x) → t (by U-Split then Q (x) ↛ t could be added to the context,
which is clearly not sound).
The applications of Simp above have an explicit counterpart inME and (on the propositional logic
level) in DPLL, the Resolve and the Subsume rules. In other words, Simp covers—and generalizes—
these rules.
Demodulation with unit constrained clauses and context literals. A constrained clause comprised of
an orientable positive unit clause and an empty constraint, i.e., a constrained clause of the form
l ≈ r · ∅ with l ≻ r , can be used to simplify by demodulation the clause part of a constrained
clause. For instance, if f (x) ≈ x · ∅ and f (y) ≈ g(y) ∨ f (a) ≉ a · f (y) → a are among the current
constrained clauses, then the latter can be simplified by two-fold demodulation with the former to
obtain y ≈ g(y) ∨ a ≉ a · f (y)→ a.19
On the other hand, even when orientable and parameter-free, (positive) rewrite literals from a
context cannot be used for demodulation. If that is desired and if the current context contains such a
parameter-free literal l → r one can always add the corresponding unit clause l ≈ r · ∅ to the current
constrained clause set and use that one for demodulation, as indicated above. From a soundness
perspective a unit clause l ≈ r · ∅ and a parameter-free rewrite literal l → r are indistinguishable;
both stand for the same ordinary unit clause l ≈ r (see Section 7 below).
19 Demodulation with unit clauses with non-empty constraints is also possible, as long as the instantiated constraints of the
demodulating clause are among the constraints of the demodulated clause, in the sense of Definition 6.3(i).
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From now on, we will consider the inference rules Simp, Assert and Compact part of the ME E
calculus.
6.5. Derivations
Derivations inME E are sequences of trees constructed with the inference rules above. Formally,
we consider ordered trees T = (N, E)whereN and E are the sets of nodes and edges of T, respectively,
and the nodes N are labeled with sequents. Wewill often identify a tree’s node with its label. Also, we
will use κ to denote any ordinal up to and including the first infinite one.
Derivation trees T (of a set {C1, . . . , Cn} of clauses) are defined inductively as follows: an initial tree, a
single-node tree with a root of the form¬v ⊢ C1 ·∅, . . . , Cn ·∅, is a derivation tree; if T is a derivation
tree, N is a leaf node of T and T′ is a tree obtained from T by adding one or two child nodes to N so that
N is the premise of an inference and the child node(s) is (are) its conclusion(s), then T′ is a derivation
tree. In this case we say that T′ is derived from T. A refutation tree is a derivation tree all of whose
leaves have a clause set containing the clause  · ∅. A derivation (of {C1, . . . , Cn}) is a possibly infinite
sequence of derivation trees that starts with an initial tree and continues with trees each of which
is derived from its immediate predecessor. Each derivation D = (Ni, Ei)i<κ for some κ determines a
limit tree (

i<κ Ni,

i<κ Ei). Note that a limit tree is indeed a tree but is not a derivation tree unless
it is finite—in which case it coincides with the last tree in the derivation.
Now let T be the limit tree of some derivation, let B = (Ni)i<κ be a branch in T with κ nodes,
and let Λi ⊢ Φi be the sequent labeling node Ni, for all i < κ . Define ΛB = i<κi≤j<κ Λj and
ΦB = i<κi≤j<κ Φj, the sets of persistent context literals and persistent clauses, respectively. These
two sets can be combined to obtain the limit sequent ΛB ⊢ ΦB (of T). The limit rewrite system is the
rewrite system RΛB , written as RB for convenience.
7. Correctness of theME E calculus
In this section we show that, for each given clause set, the ME E calculus eventually builds a
refutation tree if and only if the clause set is unsatisfiable.
7.1. Soundness
To show that the ME E calculus is sound we use an adaptation of the notion of a-satisfiability
from Baumgartner and Tinelli (2008) to the equational case. A sequent Λ ⊢ Φ is a-(un)satisfiable
iff the clause setΛa ∪ Φc is E-(un)satisfiable.
The idea behind the soundness proof is to replace, conceptually, in a refutation tree every
parameter in every context literal by the same constant a, and then treat context literals as unit
clauses and constrained clauses as ordinary clauses by considering their clause form. This results in a
refutation tree where all inferences are sound in the conventional sense. Technically, the soundness
proof relies on the fact that the derivation rules of the calculus preserve a-satisfiability, as made
precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. For every application of anME E derivation rule, if the sequent in the premise is a-satisfiable,
so is one of the sequents in the conclusion.
Proposition 7.2 (Soundness). For all setsΨ of clauses, if Ψ has a refutation tree thenΨ is E-unsatisfiable.
7.2. Completeness
As usual, the completeness ofME E relies on a suitable notion of fairness, which is defined in terms
of exhausted branches. Recall that we distinguish between themandatory derivation rules, which are
Deduce, U-Split, P-Split and Close, and the optional ones, Assert, Simp and Compact.
Definition 7.3 (Exhausted Branch). Let T be a limit tree and B = (Ni)i<κ a branch in T with κ nodes.
For all i < κ , letΛi ⊢ Φi be the sequent labeling node Ni. The branch B is exhausted iff
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(i) for all i < κ , everyME E inference with a mandatory derivation rule with premise Λi ⊢ Φi and
persistent selected rewrite literal, if any, and persistent selected clause is redundantwrt.Λj ⊢ Φj,
for some j < κ with j ≥ i, and
(ii)  · ∅ /∈ ΦB.
A limit tree of a derivation is fair iff it is a refutation tree or it has an exhausted branch. A derivation
is fair iff its limit tree is fair.
Proposition 7.4 (Exhausted Branches are Saturated). If B is an exhausted branch in a limit tree of a fair
derivation thenΛB ⊢ ΦB is saturated.
Proposition 7.4 is instrumental in the proof of our main result, which is the following.
Theorem 7.5 (Completeness). Let Ψ be a clause set and let T be the limit tree of a fair derivation of Ψ .
If T is not a refutation tree then Ψ is satisfiable; more specifically, for every exhausted branch B of T with
limit sequentΛB ⊢ ΦB we have thatΛB, RΛB |= (ΦB)ΛB and R⋆ΛB |= Ψ .
Note 7.6 (Proof Procedures). Carrying out aDeduce inferencemakes that inference redundantwrt. the
resulting sequent. Similarly, carrying out aU-Split or P-Split inferencemakes that inference redundant
wrt. both resulting sequents. This indicates that a fair proof procedure for ME E indeed exists. (The
Close rule is unproblematic.) See Section 8 for a more detailed description of the proof procedure
implemented in our system. 
For sets consisting of clauses only with literals of the form (¬)P(t1, . . . , tn) ≈ t or (¬)(t1 ≈ t2)
where each ti is either a variable or a constant, every fair derivation is finite. This is due to the following
reasons: contexts cannot grow indefinitely because no (non-contradictory) context can contain two
p-variants of the same literal, and terms cannot grow in depth. Therefore, there are only finitely many
U-Split and P-Split applications along each branch. As for constrained clauses, either their clause part
is shortened by a Ref or Neg-Res inference, or their constants are replaced by smaller constants or
variables by a Sup-Res or Neg-Res inference (recall that superposition into variables is not possible).
It is easy to see that these operations cannot be repeated infinitely often along a branch. The same
holds for the remaining rules. Altogether, this leads to the following decidability result:
Corollary 7.7 (Bernays–Schönfinkel Class with Equality). The ME E calculus can be used as a decision
procedure for the Bernays–Schönfinkel class, i.e., for sentences with the quantifier prefix ∃∗∀∗.
8. Implementation
TheME E calculus has been implementedwithin the E-Darwin theoremprover,which is a fork from
the Darwin system (Baumgartner et al., 2006) that implements the originalME calculus. E-Darwin
is intended as a testbed for equality-based reasoning in conjunction with Model Evolution. For this
purpose E-Darwin features a number of equality-related inferences in addition to the basic ME ,
including those of the predecessor calculus (Baumgartner and Tinelli, 2005). Also, E-Darwin retains
the original Darwin implementation, without equality. This enables the user to select which calculus
to employ.
E-Darwin supports input in TPTP and Protein syntax. The system operates on clauses in clause
normal form. Input formulas are clausified using the prover E (Schulz, 2002). Results can be returned
in various forms, including the SZS-compliant result status used in the CASC (Pelletier et al., 2002;
Sutcliffe and Suttner, 2006) competition for automated theorem provers. For satisfiable input E-
Darwin can return a model if it terminates. More precisely, recall that the E-Interpretation I induced
by a context is given as the rewrite system RΛ obtained from the model construction (cf. Section 4.1).
In order to effectively evaluate any ground literal L in I , by taking its normal form wrt. RΛ, one needs
to be able to identify all rewrite rules from RΛ that can reduce L. This can be done effectively if the
ordering is such that for any ground term there are only finitely many terms that are smaller than
those occurring in L. Knuth–Bendix orderings satisfy this property.
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Fig. 3.Main data structures and proving loop of E-Darwin.→ indicates a transfer from one processing phase or data structure
into another, and⇒ indicates participation in inferences.
Proofs are provided in the form of listings of the derivation steps taken, with the level of detail
being selectable. E-Darwin is implemented in the functional/imperative languageOCaml.20 The prover
is available under the GNU General Public License at the E-Darwin website.21
8.1. Proof procedure
E-Darwin uses a uniform strategy for all classes of problems. Three principal data structures are
maintained throughout the operation: the context and the set of clauses which together form the
current sequent, and the set of candidates, the latter consisting of derived clauses and candidate split
literals. The latter serves as an intermediate storage for inference results, each result being either a
clause or a context literal. Candidates are not used in the reasoning before they have been selected for
addition to the sequent and removed from the candidate set. Fig. 3 illustrates the relation between
these structures. At first the context contains only the pseudo-literal¬v, while the clause set consists
of the input. The candidate set is immediately populated by the inference results of the initial context
and the input, i.e. clauses derived byNeg-Resusing the¬v literal, and also new context literals derived
by applying Assert to unit clauses. From then on the prover loop proceeds as follows.
In step ① the heuristic selection picks one element from the candidate set. Preference is given to
candidates which can close the current derivation branch. Such candidates are detected by various
lookahead functions which continuously compare candidates against each other as well as against
the context and the clause set. Also, the selection avoids picking candidates which are subsumed
by existing clauses and context literals, and currently non-productive clauses are avoided as well.
Other selection criteria include preferring universal over parametric context literals, and clauses
with an empty clause part over those clauses that have both constraint and non-constraint literals.
Furthermore, an iterative deepening strategy, bounded by term and clause weight, favors the lighter
candidates. More importantly, it also ensures that candidates derived by the Split inferences are
selected only when all other candidate subsets have been exhausted within the weight bound. This
mechanism generates a fair derivation strategy.
A Split candidate is essentially a context literal K , but upon its selection a choice point will be set.
This allows backtracking: when all branches below K have been closed, the derivation continues with
the right split alternative of K .
Once selected, a candidate can be used for inferencing. The first inferences applied to a clause
candidate serve to reduce the clause to a minimal form. This happens in the clause reduction step
labeled ②. Here the context and the clause set can demodulate the candidate and remove literals
in accordance with the sub-rules covered by Simp. The Ref-rule makes additional reductions. This
simplification phase is iterated exhaustively until a minimal clause has been derived which renders
the original candidate clause and all intermediate clauses redundant. This means that for example a
candidate clause C may be simplified to C ′ in the first iteration, which is then reduced to C ′′ in the
next and final Simp-application. Only C ′′ will have to be added to the set of clauses after step ②.
20 caml.inria.fr.
21 www.uni-koblenz.de/~bpelzer/edarwin.
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While the goal of step② is to produce aminimal clause for the clause set, the simplification process
may also result in a tautological or redundant clause. In that case the prover returns to step ① for a
new candidate. Another possibility is that the candidate clause gets reduced to the empty clause. This
closes the branch immediately and initiates the backtracking procedure.
After the reduction the candidate is used as a premise in those inferences which derive new
candidates, a step labeled ③ in the figure. Note that new context literals proceed to ③ right away
after their selection in ①, skipping the simplification in ②. For a new clause with a non-empty clause
part the derivation rules applied in step ③ are Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and Neg-Res. The premise partners
are taken from the context or the clause set as required. If a new clause has nothing but constraint
literals, then it is subject to the Split rules as well as to Close. The optional Assert rule is applied to all
selected clause candidates.
In principle these operations are accomplishedby searches in discrimination tree indexes (McCune,
1992) over the sequent. Both imperfect and perfect indexing trees are used. The latter are an addition
over the original Darwin, primarily serving to support the new superposition-based term rewriting.
In practice these index searches are expensive, so E-Darwin keeps track of which pairings of context
literals and clause positions unify and hence can be used as inference premises. Since terms are
shared between literals and literals between clauses, this caching minimizes expensive index lookup
operations, allowing a context literal to find all occurrences of amatching subterm in the set of clauses
with a single index search and vice versa.
If the selected candidate is a new context literal, E-Darwin first attempts to Closewith any existing
clause and other context literals as required, triggering the backtracking mechanism if successful.
Otherwise all Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos, Neg-Res and Assert inferences are computed in conjunction with
the current sequent.
Any selected candidate may be able to simplify previously derived clauses, so Simp is computed. If
a clause C is determined to be simplifiable by a candidate into C ′, C ′ is treated as an inference result and
added to the candidate set. A redundancy mechanism then essentially deactivates C for the current
sequent. Nevertheless this clause is still kept by E-Darwin, as its simplification may become invalid
during backtracking. In this case the deactivation is quickly reversible, returning the original clause
to the reasoning process.
All inference results passing some sanity checks are stored in the appropriate candidate set in
step ④. In the final step ⑤ the selected candidate is inserted into the sequent, either into the context,
applying Compact in the process, or into the clause set. Then the cycle starts anew.
From the implementation perspective, the possibility to derive new clauses is a significant
difference between theME and theME E calculus. The implementation ofME in Darwinmaintains a
dynamic context and candidate set, while the set of clauses remains static, as no clause is ever added
beyond the input. In E-Darwin, however, all sets must be dynamic in order to allow the derivation of
newclauses. In comparison to the basicDarwin provermost existingmodules had to bemodified for E-
Darwin. Combinedwith the additions this has resulted in an increase of the code size by approximately
50%.
8.2. Experimental evaluation
We have tested E-Darwin over those problems of the TPTP library Version 4.0.1 (Sutcliffe and
Suttner, 1998) that are given in clause normal form (CNF) or as first order formulas (FOF). Overall
the test set consisted of 13783 problems, constituting 83% of the whole TPTP with 16512 problems.
(The remaining 17% of TPTP consist of higher-order logic problems, which are inappropriate for most
current first-order automated theorem provers, including E-Darwin.) E-Darwin implements different
selectable calculi, so for the test the prover was configured to use theME E calculus as described in
this paper. The test systems featured an Intel Q9950 quad processors at 2.83GHz. E-Darwin does not
support parallelization at this point, so each problem was handled by one process utilizing one CPU
core. The memory was limited to 1GB for each problem, and the maximum time allowed per problem
was 300 seconds. Under these conditions E-Darwin solved 5977 problems, corresponding to 43.4%
of the tested problems, or 36.2% of the full TPTP. The test set contains 3010 problems which carry a
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Table 1
Comparison of our E-Darwin test results with the results for other
provers on the same test set of 13783 problems as stated on the
TPTP-website. The table lists the number of TPTP problems solved
which are unsatisfiable (UNS), satisfiable (SAT), theorems (THM,
unsatisfiable FOF problems with a conjecture) and countersatisfiable
(CSA, satisfiable FOF problems with a conjecture), and finally the total
number of problems solved as well as the percentage in relation to the
complete test set.
ATP system UNS SAT THM CSA total
Bliksem 1.12 2821 0 1685 0 4506 (33%)
Darwin 1.4.5 2327 507 2180 301 5315 (39%)
E 1.1 4211 536 3610 333 8690 (63%)
Equinox 4.1 2079 0 2487 0 4566 (33%)
E-Darwin 1.3 2765 521 2344 347 5977 (43%)
E-KRHyper 1.1.3 2022 235 1828 303 4388 (32%)
Geo 2007f 2270 623 1703 460 5056 (37%)
iProver 0.7 2687 604 3031 369 6691 (49%)
Metis 2.2 2257 0 1926 28 4211 (31%)
Otter 3.3 1691 0 1518 0 3209 (23%)
Prover9 0908 2834 0 2189 0 5023 (36%)
SNARK 20080805 2843 0 2446 0 5289 (38%)
SPASS 3.01 3406 535 2893 321 7155 (52%)
Vampire 11.0 4265 0 3229 0 7494 (54%)
rating of 1.00, which means that no automated theorem prover solves these problems at the time of
the release of the TPTP version 4.0.1. E-Darwin proves six of these problems.22
The TPTP subset we used for our tests is commonly used for evaluating automated theorem
provers for first-order logic. The TPTP organizers periodically test theorem provers on appropriate
TPTP problem sets and list the results on the TPTP website.23 In Table 1 we quote the official TPTP
results for a number of provers which have been tested on the same subset of the TPTP we used. The
TPTP testing conditions are comparable to ours. The provers in the list are Bliksem (de Nivelle, 1999),
Darwin (Baumgartner et al., 2006), E (Schulz, 2002), Equinox (Claessen, 2005), E-KRHyper (Pelzer and
Wernhard, 2007), Geo (de Nivelle andMeng, 2006), iProver (Korovin, 2008), Metis (Hurd, 2003), Otter
(McCune, 2003), Prover9,24 SNARK (Stickel et al., 2000), SPASS (Weidenbach et al., 2007) and Vampire
(Riazanov and Voronkov, 2002). The table also includes our own E-Darwin results for comparison.
Overall our system occupies a middle ground, solving more problems than several established
provers, but it does not rank among the top-rated systems. However, for a first implementation of
the new calculus we believe this is a promising start. Generally E-Darwin offers an improvement
over the original Darwin, but it must be noted that Darwin outperforms its successor in specialized
problem classes. The original system excels at problems with a finite Herbrand universe — in 2006
and 2007 it won the EPR division (effectively propositional problems) of CASC. On the other hand it
was surpassed by the Otter system in several other categories (Otter serves as a benchmark in CASC
as it has remained stable and unchanged for many years). The new calculus as implemented in E-
Darwin is more generalized in its capabilities. Having participated in CASC in 2010, E-Darwin did
not reach Darwin’s positions for effectively propositional problems, but unlike Darwin it exceeded
the Otter benchmark in the divisions CNF (clause normal form problems), FNE (first-order formula
problems without equality), HNE (Horn without equality), NEQ (non-Horn with equality) and PEQ
(purely equational). Only in the HEQ category (Horn with equality) did E-Darwin position below the
benchmark, but this was the case for Darwin as well.
22 These six problems are: ALG035+1, GRP197-1, NUM378+1.020.015, PRO016+1, SWV527-1.040, and SWV527-1.050.
23 http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/TPTP/Results.html.
24 http://www.cs.unm.edu/~mccune/prover9/.
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The uniform strategy of E-Darwin is a limitation at this point. At its core it remains the strategy
used in the original Darwin for the non-equationalME -calculus, and which had to decide between
new context literals and splits. For E-Darwin this was extended by the selection of derived clauses,
but the current scheme may be too rigid to account for all different problem classes. Our testing has
shown that minor changes to the selection heuristics of E-Darwin can have a significant effect on the
time it takes to solve a problem. The heuristics settings used to achieve the test results above were
chosen to maximize the number of proofs. While other settings would result in slightly less problems
solved in total, thesewould nevertheless include some problems that are not solved under the optimal
settings. One noteworthy such parameter concerns the selection frequency of clauseswith at least one
constraint literal and at least one non-constraint literal. Such clauses cannot be used for closing, they
can add great complexity to the derivation as superposition premises, and their actual relevance for
a proof is difficult to estimate beforehand. A minor adjustment to their selection rate can mean a
difference between solving a problem in less than five seconds and the same problem requiring over
five minutes. More elaborate lookahead functions could provide some guidance here. Also, when the
effects can be so large, an approach based on time slices may be appropriate, with the prover testing
several strategies during the time allowed for a proof.
9. Conclusions
We have presented theME E calculus, an extension of the Model Evolution calculus (Baumgartner
and Tinelli, 2003, 2008) by superposition-based inference rules for equality. The ME E calculus as
presented here is an extensively revised and improved version of an earlier extension of Model
Evolution by equality inference rules (Baumgartner and Tinelli, 2005). The differences are numerous
and include a, we think, simpler presentation and much more powerful redundancy criteria.
Ourmain theoretical result is the correctness ofME E, in particular its completeness in combination
with redundancy criteria. Our main practical result is the implementation in the E-Darwin system,
described here for the first time. E-Darwin is a non-trivial extension of our earlier Darwin
implementation. It performs reasonably well on the TPTP problem library and is able to solve six
previously unsolved problems from that library.
As for future work, on the theoretical side, we plan to investigate howME E can be exploited to
obtain decision procedures for certain fragments of first-order logic that are beyond the scope of
current superposition or instance-based methods. A key idea is to consider alternative formalisms
to denote interpretations that are able to represent a larger class of infinite models, and adapt the
derivation rules accordingly.
More on the applied side, it would be useful to investigate translations from practically interesting
problems to fragments that can be decided by ME E. In particular, ME E is a decision procedure for
function-free clause logic (like other instance-basedmethods)with equality, a classwith aNEXPTIME-
complete satisfiability problem. Problems from that class include satisfiability of SHOIQ knowledge
bases, first-ordermodel expansion (a certain kind of constraint satisfaction problems), satisfiability of
formulas of the Ackermann classwith equality, Satisfiability of DQBF (DependencyQuantified Boolean
Formulas, a generalization of QBF), first-order logic with two variables and counting quantifiers, and
more. The challenge here is to find practically useful reductions into function-free clause logic.
The E-Darwin implementation, although already quite sophisticated, could still be improved. One
of themost promising options is perhaps to look intomore refined heuristics and strategies for search
space exploration. In particular, the currently used iterative deepening on term weights is often too
inflexible for refutation finding. Sometimes it is easy to find a refutation by starting with a certain
weight bound n, but iterative deepening will get stuck on exploring all smaller bounds within a set
time limit.
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Appendix. Proofs
This appendix contains auxiliary lemmas, their proofs, and proofs of the results stated in the main
part of this paper.
Lemma 4.8. Let l and r be ground terms with l ≻ r.
(i) If l → r ∈ RΛ thenΛ produces l → r.
(ii) If l and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ thenΛ strongly produces l ↛ r.
Proof. The statement (i) follows immediately from the definition of RΛ. Concerning (ii), suppose that
l and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ. If Λ produces l → r we distinguish two cases. If RΛ generates l → r
then l is reducible by l → r ∈ RΛ. If RΛ does not generate l → r then, by definition of RΛ, l or r must
be reducible wrt. (RΛ)l→r , hence reducible wrt. RΛ. Both cases thus contradict the assumption that l
and r are irreducible wrt. RΛ. It follows thatΛ does not produce l → r .
Thanks to the presence of the pseudo-literal¬x in every context, it is not difficult to see that every
context produces K or K , for every literal K . Thus, withΛ not producing l → r we can conclude that
Λ strongly produces l ↛ r . 
Definition Appendix A.2 (Relevant Closures wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ). LetΛ ⊢ Φ be a sequent andD a ground
closure. Define
ΦΛ = {(C · Γ , γ ) | C · Γ ∈ Φ and (C · Γ , γ ) is a relevant closure wrt.Λ}, and
ΦΛD = {C ∈ ΦΛ | D ≻ C} .
Inwords,ΦΛD is the set of relevant closureswrt.Λ of all constrained clauses fromΦ that are all smaller
wrt.≻ thanD .
Lemma Appendix A.3. If (i) (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ and D , (ii) (C · Γ , γ ) is a relevant
closure of C · Γ wrt.Λ, and (iii) (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛD then (Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ).
Proof. Assume (i), (ii) and (iii). We have to show (Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ).
IfΛ |̸= (Γ , γ ) then the conclusion follows trivially. Hence assumeΛ |= (Γ , γ ) fromnowon. From
(ii) conclude RΛ |= Γ γ by definition of relevance. With Λ |= (Γ , γ ), Definition 6.3 gives us ground
closures (Ci · Γi, γi) of constrained clauses Ci · Γi ∈ Φ that satisfy conditions (i)–(iii) in Definition 6.3.
With Λ |= (Γ , γ ) from property (i) in Definition 6.3 it follows RΛ |= Γiγi. Thus, each (Ci · Γi, γi)
is a relevant closure wrt. Λ. Likewise, with RΛ |= Γ γ from property (i) in Definition 6.3 it follows
Λ |= (Γi, γi).
By condition (ii) in Definition 6.3, (Ci · Γi, γi) is smaller thanD . More formally, thus, (Ci · Γi, γi) ∈
ΦΛD , andwith (iii) conclude (Λ, RΛ) |= (Ci ·Γi, γi). WithΛ |= (Γi, γi) from above it follows R⋆Λ |= Ciγi.
By property (iii) of redundancy, C1γ1, . . . , Cnγn |= Cγ or C1γ1, . . . , Cnγn |= l ≈ r for some ground
terms l and r with l ≻ r and such that Γ γ is reducible by l → r .
In the first case conclude R⋆Λ |= Cγ , and from that, trivially, (Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ), and nothing
remains to be shown.
In the second case conclude R⋆Λ |= l ≈ r with l and r as stated above. Because RΛ is a convergent
rewrite system, the normal forms of l and of r wrt. RΛ are the same. Because l is greater wrt. ≻ than
r , l must be reducible by some rule in l′ → r ′ ∈ RΛ. But then, as Γ γ is reducible by l → r , it is
straightforward to see thatΓ γ is reducible by l′ → r ′ aswell. In otherwords, RΛ |̸= Γ γ , contradicting
the assumption (ii). Hence the second case is impossible. 
Proposition Appendix A.4. Let Λ ⊢ Φ be a sequent and (C · Γ , γ ) a ground closure. If (i) C · Γ is
redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ , (ii) (C · Γ , γ ) is a relevant ground closure wrt.Λ, and (iii) (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ(C ·Γ ,γ )
then (Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ).
Proof. Immediate from Lemma Appendix A.3 by settingD = (C · Γ , γ ) in Definition 6.3. 
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Lemma Appendix A.5. If C · Γ is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ ,Λ′ is obtained fromΛ by deleting p-instances
of other rewrite literals inΛ and/or by adding non-contradictory rewrite literals, andΦ ′ is obtained from
Φ by deleting constrained clauses that are redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ and/or by adding arbitrary constrained
clauses, then C · Γ is redundant wrt.Λ′ ⊢ Φ ′.
Proof. It is obvious fromDefinition 6.3 that a clause that is redundantwrt.Λ ⊢ Φ remains redundant
if an arbitrary constrained clause is added to Φ; if a p-instance of another literal in Λ is deleted
(by Compact) or a non-contradictory literal is added to Λ one needs to prove that, in terms of
Definition 6.3, (C · Γ , γ ) remains redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ and D . The non-trivial case is when
Λ |̸= (Γ , γ ) holds, but it is straightforward to check thatΛ |̸= (Γ , γ ) is preserved even then.
To prove that a clause that is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ remains redundant if redundant clauses
are deleted from Φ , it suffices to show that the clauses Ci · Γi ∈ Φ in Definition 6.3 can always
be chosen in such a way that they are not themselves redundant or their deletion does not affect
redundancy of C · Γ : suppose that a ground closure (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ andD . Let
{ (Ci · Γi, γi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n } be a minimal set of ground closures of clauses in Φ (wrt. the multiset
extension of the clause ordering) that satisfies the conditions of Definition 6.3. Suppose that one of
the (Ci · Γi, γi), say (C1 · Γ1, γ1), is redundant itself. Then eitherΛ |̸= (Γ1, γ1) and by condition (i) in
Definition 6.3 it followsΛ |̸= (Γ , γ ), and so (C ·Γ , γ ) remains to be redundant, or there exist ground
closures (C1i · Γ1i, γ1i) of constrained clauses C1i · Γ1i ∈ Φ that satisfy the conditions of Definition 6.3
for (C1 ·Γ1, γ1). But then { (Ci ·Γi, γi) | 2 ≤ i ≤ n } ∪ { (C1i ·Γ1i, γ1i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m }would also satisfy the
conditions of Definition 6.3 for (C ·Γ , γ ), contradicting theminimality of { (Ci ·Γi, γi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n }. 
Lemma Appendix A.6. If aDeduce inference is redundantwrt.Λ ⊢ Φ ,Λ′ is obtained fromΛ by deleting
p-instances of other rewrite literals in Λ and/or by adding non-contradictory rewrite literals, and Φ ′ is
obtained from Φ by deleting constrained clauses that are redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ and/or by adding
arbitrary constrained clauses, then this Deduce inference is redundant wrt.Λ′ ⊢ Φ ′.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma Appendix A.5. 
Lemma Appendix A.7 (ιBase-inferences Preserve Relevant Closures). Let Λ ⊢ Φ be a sequent and
assume an ιBase inference with right (or only) premise C · Γ , conclusion C ′ · Γ ′, and a ground instance
via γ of the ιBase inference such that
(i) (C · Γ , γ ) is a relevant closure of C · Γ wrt.Λ, andΛ |= (Γ , γ ),
(ii-a) in case of Sup-Neg or Sup-Pos, where l → r is the left premise and σ is the mgu used, l → r
produces (l → r)σ in Λ, l → r produces (l → r)γ in Λ, and (l → r)γ generates the rule
(l → r)γ in RΛ, and
(ii-b) in case of Neg-Res, where l → r is the left premise and σ is the mgu used, ¬A produces (s ↛ t)σ
inΛ, ¬A produces (s ↛ t)γ inΛ, and sγ and tγ are irreducible wrt. RΛ.
Then, (C ′ · Γ ′, γ ) is a relevant closure of C ′ · Γ ′ wrt.Λ, andΛ |= (Γ ′, γ ).
Proof. For convenience we abbreviate R := RΛ below.
With (i), by Definitions 5.5 and 5.7 we have Λ |= (C · Γ , γ ), i.e., Γ γ is ordered and for every
K ◃ L ∈ Γ , K produces L in Λ and K produces Lγ in Λ, and if l → r ∈ Γ γ then l → r ∈ R, and if
l ↛ r ∈ Γ γ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. We have to show
(1) Γ ′γ is ordered,
(2) for every K ′ ◃ L′ ∈ Γ ′, K ′ produces L′ inΛ and K ′ produces L′γ inΛ,
(3) if l → r ∈ Γ ′γ then l → r ∈ R, and
(4) if l ↛ r ∈ Γ ′γ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R.
The property (1) is easily obtained from inspection of the ιBase inference rules. It remains to show
(2)–(4).
Let σ be the mgu used in the ιBase inference, as mentioned in case (ii-a) and (ii-b). Assume σ is
idempotent, which is the case with usual unification algorithms. Because γ gives a ground instance
of the given ιBase inference, γ must be a unifier for the same terms as σ . Because σ is a most general
unifier, there is a substitution δ such that γ = σδ. With the idempotency of σ we get γ = σδ =
σσδ = σγ .
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For later use we prove some simple facts:
(i) if K ◃ Lσ ∈ Γ σ then K produces Lσ inΛ and K produces Lσγ inΛ.
Proof: Assume K ◃ Lσ ∈ Γ σ . We already know that K produces L inΛ and K produces Lγ in
Λ. If K did not produce Lσ inΛ then there would be a K ′ ∈ Λ≥ with K  K ′ & Lσ . With γ = σδ
and by transitivity of &we would get K  K ′ & Lγ , and so K would not produce Lγ either. With
γ = σγ obtained above the second claim is trivial.
(ii) if l → r ∈ Γ σγ then l → r ∈ R.
Proof: we already know that if l → r ∈ Γ γ then l → r ∈ R. The claim then follows
immediately with γ = σγ .
(iii) if l ↛ r ∈ Γ σγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R.
Proof:we already know that if l ↛ r ∈ Γ γ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. The claim then
follows immediately with γ = σγ .
To prove (2)–(4) we carry out a case analysis with respect to the ιBase inference rule applied.
In case of a Ref inference let the premise be s ≉ t ∨ C ′′ · Γ and the conclusion C ′ · Γ ′ = (C ′′ · Γ )σ .
Recall that σ is not applied to context literals of constraints, and so the context literals of Γ and Γ ′
are the same. With Γ ′ = Γ σ , (2) follows directly from fact (i), (3) follows immediately from fact (ii),
and (4) follows immediately from fact (iii).
In case of a Sup-Neg inference let the left premise be l → r , the right premise C · Γ = s[u]p ≈
t ∨ C ′′ · Γ and the conclusion C ′ · Γ ′ = (s[r]p ≈ t ∨ C ′′ · Γ , l → r ◃ l → r)σ . The proofs of (2),
(3) and (4) for the subset Γ σ of Γ ′ follows immediately from facts (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively. Now
consider the sole additional element (l → r)σ that is in Γ ′ but not in Γ σ . Recall we are given that
l → r produces (l → r)σ in Λ and that l → r produces (l → r)γ = (l → r)σγ in Λ, which
proves (2). Regarding (3), recall we are given that (l → r)γ generates (l → r)γ in R, which entails
(l → r)γ = (l → r)σγ ∈ R.
The proof for the case of a Sup-Pos inference is the same, and the proof for the case of a Neg-Res is
similar and is omitted. 
Theorem 6.6 (Static Completeness). If Λ ⊢ Φ is a saturated sequent with a non-contradictory context
Λ and·∅ /∈ Φ then (Λ, RΛ) satisfies all relevant instances of all clauses inΦ wrt.Λ , i.e., (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ.
Moreover, if Ψ is a clause set andΦ includes Ψ , i.e., {D · ∅ | D ∈ Ψ } ⊆ Φ , then R⋆Λ |= Ψ .
Proof. LetΛ ⊢ Φ be a saturated sequent with a non-contradictory context and suppose  · ∅ /∈ Φ .
To complete the proof of the first statement we show that every relevant closure (C ·Γ , γ )wrt.Λ,
of every constrained clause C · Γ ∈ Φ is canonically satisfied, i.e., satisfies the property
(P) (Λ, RΛ) |= (C · Γ , γ ).
Once (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ is established we get the second statement R⋆Λ |= Ψ by the following
argumentation. Let Cγ be a ground instance of a clause C ∈ Ψ . It suffices to show R⋆Λ |= Cγ . With
Definition 5.7 it follows that every ground closure of a constrained clause with empty constraint is
always relevant, for every pair (Λ, R). Hence, and more formally, (C · ∅, γ ) ⊆ {D · ∅ | D ∈ Ψ }Λ.
With {D · ∅ | D ∈ Ψ } ⊆ Φ conclude trivially (C · ∅, γ ) ⊆ ΦΛ. With (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ we get
(Λ, RΛ) |= (C · ∅, γ ), which meansΛ |̸= ∅, γ or R⋆Λ |= Cγ , equivalently R⋆Λ |= Cγ .
We prove (P) by contradiction. Every counterexample, that is, every closure (C · Γ , γ ) of a
constrained clause C · Γ ∈ Φ that is relevant wrt. Λ and that does not satisfy (P) must satisfy the
following properties:
(i) RΛ |= Γ γ , by relevancy.
(ii) Λ |= (Γ , γ ), and
(iii) R⋆Λ |̸= Cγ , from (C · Γ , γ ) not satisfying (P) by Definition 5.2.
Among all counterexamples, by well-foundedness of the ordering ≻ on ground closures, there
is a minimal counterexample (minimal wrt. ≻). From now on let (C · Γ , γ ) be such a minimal
counterexample.
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By minimality of (C ·Γ , γ ), every relevant closure of a constrained clause inΦ that is smaller wrt.
≻ than (C · Γ , γ ) satisfies (P). More formally, (Λ, RΛ) |= ΦΛ(C ·Γ ,γ ). Let us consider all possible cases.
(1) (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ .
If (C · Γ , γ ) is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ , then by Lemma Appendix A.3, settingD = (C · Γ , γ ) there,
(P) follows immediately, contradicting our assumption. Hence, (C · Γ , γ ) cannot be redundant wrt.
Λ ⊢ Φ .
(2) Var(C)γ is reducible wrt. RΛ.
TheME E calculus does not paramodulate into or below variables. To explain the completeness of this
restriction we need to know that Var(C)γ is irreducible wrt. RΛ.
From (i) we know RΛ |= Γ γ . First we show that every term in (Var(C) ∩ Var(Γ ))γ is irreducible
wrt.RΛ. If therewere such a term, reduciblewrt.RΛ, occurring in a negative rewrite literal l ↛ r ∈ Γ γ
then we would immediately get a contradiction to RΛ |= Γ γ . If there were such a term occurring in
a positive rewrite literal l → r ∈ Γ γ then l → r is reducible by a smaller rule from RΛ, and hence
l → r cannot be generated in RΛ, again contradicting RΛ |= Γ γ . That rule is indeed smaller than
l → r follows from the fact that by construction, as superposition into variables is not possible, Γ
cannot contain rewrite literals of the form x → t , where x is a variable. Thus, if x ∈ Var(C) ∩ Var(Γ )
then xγ is a proper subterm of l (or a subterm of r).
If xγ is reducible for some x ∈ Var(C) \ Var(Γ ), then a term in the range of γ can be replaced
by a smaller yet congruent term wrt. R⋆Λ. Observe that this results in a smaller (wrt. ≻) relevant
counterexample, thus contradicting the choice of (C · Γ , γ ).
In summary, thus, Var(C)γ is irreducible wrt. RΛ.
(3) C = s ≉ t ∨ D with selected literal s ≉ t.
Suppose that none of the preceding cases holds and C · Γ = s ≉ t ∨ D · Γ and s ≉ t is selected in
s ≉ t ∨ D.
(3.1) sγ = tγ .
If sγ = tγ then there is a groundDeduce inferencewith premise Cγ = (s ≉ t∨D·Γ )γ and conclusion
(D ·Γ )γ , which is an instance of a Deduce inference with an underlying Ref inference applied to C ·Γ
inference with selected clause s ≉ t ∨ D · Γ and conclusion (D · Γ )σ . It is safe to assume that σ is
idempotent, which gives us σγ = γ .
By saturation, that Deduce inference is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ . Because the closure (C · Γ , γ )
of the premise C · Γ is not redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ , the derived clause, taken as the closure
((D · Γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′)σ , γ ) must be redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ and (C · Γ , γ ) by definition of
redundant inferences. Furthermore, with Lemma Appendix A.7 it is a relevant closure wrt. Λ, hence,
by Lemma Appendix A.3, (Λ, RΛ) |= (D · Γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′)σ , γ ). By definition, this means
Λ |̸= ((Γ ∪ {l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′})σ , γ ) or R⋆Λ |= Dσγ . However, Lemma Appendix A.7 gives us
additionallyΛ |= ((Γ ∪ {l′ → r ′◃l′ → r ′})σ , γ ), and so the former case is impossible. But then, from
R⋆Λ |= Dσγ and with σγ = γ it follows R⋆Λ |= Dγ , and so, trivially, R⋆Λ |= Cγ , a plain contradiction to
(iii) above.
(3.2) sγ ≠ tγ .
If sγ ≠ tγ then without loss of generality assume sγ ≻ tγ . The property (iii) above is R⋆Λ |̸= (s ≉
t ∨D)γ , and so R⋆Λ |= (s ≈ t)γ . Because RΛ is a convergent (ordered) rewrite system, sγ and tγ must
have the same normal forms. In particular, thus, sγ is reducible wrt. RΛ. Suppose sγ = (sγ )[l]p for
some position p and rule l → r ∈ RΛ. With Lemma 4.8(i) it follows that Λ produces l → r . For later
use let l′ → r ′ be a fresh p-variant of a rewrite literal inΛ that produces l → r inΛ and assume that
γ has already been extended so that (l′ → r ′)γ = l → r .
The conclusions so far give that Deduce is applicable with underlying ground Sup-Neg inference
with left premise (l′ → r ′)γ , right premise sγ [l′γ ]p ≉ tγ ∨ Dγ · Γ γ and conclusion sγ [r ′γ ]p ≉
tγ ∨ Dγ · Γ γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ (l′ → r ′)γ . The next step is to show that this ground inference is a ground
instance via γ of a Sup-Neg inference with premises l′ → r ′ and C · Γ = s[u]p ≉ t ∨ D · Γ and
conclusion (s[r ′]p ≉ t ∨ D · Γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′)σ , where σ is an mgu of l′ and u.
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The position p in sγ cannot be at or below a variable position in s, because otherwise we had
xγ [l′γ ]p for some variable x occurring in s, and so xγ would be reducible by (l′ → r ′)γ = l → r),
which is impossible by case (2) above. Hence, the position p exists in s, and the term u at that position
is not a variable. Then it follows easily that the mgu σ of l′ and u exists. It is safe to assume that σ is
idempotent, which gives us σγ = γ .
By saturation, the Deduce inference is redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ . Because the closure (C · Γ , γ )
of the premise C · Γ is not redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ , the derived clause, taken as the closure
((s[r ′]p ≉ t ∨ D · Γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′)σ , γ ) must be redundant wrt. Λ ⊢ Φ and (C · Γ , γ ) by
definition of redundant inferences. Furthermore, with Lemma Appendix A.7 it is a relevant closure
wrt. Λ, hence, by Lemma Appendix A.3, (Λ, RΛ) |= ((s[r ′]p ≉ t ∨ D · Γ , l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′)σ , γ ).
By definition, this means Λ |̸= ((Γ ∪ {l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′})σ , γ ) or R⋆Λ |= (s[r ′]p ≉ t ∨ D)σγ .
However, Lemma Appendix A.7 gives us additionally Λ |= ((Γ ∪ {l′ → r ′ ◃ l′ → r ′})σ , γ ), and
R⋆Λ |= (s[r ′]p ≉ t ∨ D)σγ follows. With σγ = γ we get a plain contradiction to (iii) above.
With (l′ → r ′)γ ∈ RΛ by congruence and σγ = γ it follows R⋆Λ |= (s ≉ t ∨ D)γ , however
R⋆Λ |̸= (s ≉ t ∨ D)γ was assumed for case (3.2) above, a plain contradiction.
(4) C = s ≈ t ∨ D with selected literal s ≈ t.
Suppose C ·Γ = s ≈ t∨D·Γ and s ≈ t is selected in s ≈ t∨D.With (C ·Γ , γ ) being a counterexample
it followsΛ |= (Γ , γ ) but R⋆Λ |̸= (s ≈ t ∨D)γ . From the latter conclude immediately R⋆Λ |̸= (s ≈ t)γ ,
and so sγ = tγ is impossible. Hence suppose sγ ≠ tγ . We distinguish two further cases.
(4.1) sγ or tγ is reducible wrt. RΛ.
If sγ or tγ is reduciblewrt. RΛ then there is a rule l → r ∈ RΛ such that sγ = sγ [l]p or tγ = tγ [l]p, for
some position p. But then the same argumentation as in case (3.2) applies. The only changes are that
instead of a (ground instance of a) Sup-Neg inference now a (ground instance of a) Sup-Pos inference
is considered, and that s ≻ t does not apply.
(4.2) sγ and tγ are irreducible wrt. RΛ.
If sγ and tγ are irreducible wrt. RΛ then assume, w.l.o.g., sγ ≻ tγ . With Lemma 4.8(ii) then conclude
that some literal ¬A ∈ Λ produces (s ↛ t)γ in Λ. This indicates that a Deduce inference with an
underlying groundNeg-Res inference exists. More precisely, the left premise of that ground inference
is (s ↛ t)γ , the right premise is (s ≈ t ∨ D · Γ )γ and the conclusion is (D · Γ ,¬A ◃ s ↛ t)γ . It is
routine by now to check that this ground Neg-Res inference is a ground instance via γ of a Neg-Res
inference with a right premise fromΦ that is not redundant wrt.Λ ⊢ Φ , and the left premise¬A.
The rest of the proof uses the same arguments as in case (3.2) and is omitted (we can show that the
Deduce inferencewith the latter underlyingNeg-Res inference exists, whichwill yield a contradiction
to the conclusion R⋆Λ |̸= (s ≈ t ∨ D)γ drawn for case (4) above).
(5) C = .
Suppose C · Γ =  · Γ . By assumption  · ∅ /∈ Φ , and so Γ ≠ ∅. First we are going to show that Split
is applicable to Λ ⊢ Φ with selected clause  · Γ ∈ Φ . With property (ii), Λ produces every literal
in Γ . More specifically, L′ produces L inΛ and L′ produces Lγ inΛ, for every L′ ◃ L ∈ Γ . (*).
If Closewere applicable, then, by saturation, this Close inference would be redundant, which is the
case only if  · ∅ ∈ Φ , which we have already excluded. Hence, Close is not applicable, and there is a
literal K ∈ Γ such that (i) K is variable-disjoint with Γ \ {K} and there is no K ′ ∈ Λ≥ with K & K ′, or
otherwise (ii) there is no K ′ ∈ Λ≥ with K ′ ∼ K . In case (i) conclude that K is not contradictory with
Λ, and in case (ii) conclude that L is not contradictory withΛ, where L is a variable-free variant of K .
This conclusion will be needed below when we consider a Split inference.
In order to show that Split is applicable we still need to know in case (ii) that L is not contradictory
withΛ. This follow easily from Definition 4.4 and the conclusion above thatΛ produces every literal
in Γ . In case (i), thus, U-Split is applicable, and in case (ii) P-Split is applicable with selected clause
 · Γ and split literal K and L, respectively.
By redundancy then, (a) there is a L′ ◃ L ∈ Γ such that L′ does not produce L in Λ, or (b) in the
P-Split case the split literal is contradictory with Λ. The case (a) plainly contradicts (*), and case (b)
plainly contradicts an earlier conclusion that L is not contradictory withΛ. 
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Lemma 7.1. For every application of anME E derivation rule, if the sequent in the premise is a-satisfiable,
so is one of the sequents in the conclusion.
Proof. We prove the claim for each derivation rule ofME E.
Deduce) Let Λ ⊢ Φ be the premise sequent and Λ ⊢ Φ,D the conclusion sequent, and let I be an
E-model ofΛa ∪ Φc.
If D is the conclusion of a Ref inference, then D = (C · Γ )σ for some constrained clause s ≉
t ∨ C · Γ ∈ Φ and mgu σ of s and t . Observing that Dc = (C · Γ )cσ and I |̸= (s ≉ t)σ , it is easy to see
that I satisfies Dc as well.
If D is the conclusion of a Sup-Pos or a Sup-Neg inference, then it has the form (L[r]p ∨ C · Γ , l →
r)σ for some constrained clause L[l′]p ∨ C · Γ ∈ Φ , rewrite literal l → r ∈ Λ, and mgu σ of l and l′.
By elementary satisfiability arguments, we have that since I is a model of l ≈ r and of (L[l′]p∨C · Γ )c,
it is also a model of (L[l]p ∨ C · Γ , l → r)cσ , and so of D.
IfD is the conclusion of aNeg-Res inference, thenD = (C ·Γ , s ↛ t)σ for some constrained clause
s ≉ t ∨ C · Γ ∈ Φ and substitution σ . In that case, I satisfies Dc simply because Dc is equivalent to
(s ≉ t ∨ C · Γ )cσ , and I satisfies (s ≉ t ∨ C · Γ )c by assumption.
P-Split) Let Λ ⊢ Φ be the premise sequent and let Λ, L ⊢ Φ and Λ, L ⊢ Φ be the two conclusion
sequents. Suppose that Λ ⊢ Φ is a-satisfiable and note that La is ground. Clearly, one of the two
clause sets
Λa ∪ {La} ∪ Φc and Λa ∪ {La} ∪ Φc
must be E-satisfiable. By definition, this means that eitherΛ, L ⊢ Φ orΛ, L ⊢ Φ is a-satisfiable.
U-Split) Let Λ ⊢ Φ,  · K1, . . . , Kn be the premise sequent where n ≥ 1 and K1 is variable disjoint
with K2, . . . , Kn. Let Λ, K 1 ⊢ Φ,  · K1, . . . , Kn and Λ ⊢ Φ,  · K2, . . . , Kn be the two conclusion
sequents. Suppose the premise is a-satisfiable. Then, the clause set
Λa ∪ Φc ∪ {K 1 ∨ K 2 ∨ · · · ∨ K n} (A.1)
is E-satisfiable. Consider any E-interpretation that satisfies (A.1) as well as the unit clause K1.
Observing that K a1 = K1, we can conclude that Λ, K 1 ⊢ Φ,  · K1, . . . , Kn is a-satisfiable. Now
consider any E-interpretation that satisfies (A.1) but falsifies some ground instance of K1. Since K1 is
variable disjoint with K 2 ∨ · · · ∨ K n, such an interpretation must satisfy the latter clause. It follows
thatΛ ⊢ Φ,  · K2, . . . , Kn is a-satisfiable.
Close) LetΛ ⊢ Φ,  · K1, . . . , Kn be the premise sequent andΛ ⊢ Φ,  · ∅ the conclusion sequent.
Since, trivially,Λa ∪ (Φ,  · ∅)c is E-unsatisfiable, we must show thatΛa ∪ (Φ,  · K1, . . . , Kn)c is
too. For that, it is enough to show thatΛa ∪ {K 1 ∨ · · · ∨ K n} is E-unsatisfiable.25
By the rule’s definition for every i = 1, . . . , n there is a Li ∈ Λ≥ such that Ki & Li if Ki is variable-
disjoint with Γ \ Ki and Ki ∼ Li otherwise. This means that there exist L1, . . . , Ln ∈ Λ≥ such that the
sets
{La1, K1}, {La2, K2}, . . . , {Lan, Kn}
admit a simultaneous unifier σ . As a consequence, the set {La1, . . . , Lan, K 1∨ · · · ∨K n} is unsatisfiable,
and hence E-unsatisfiable. To see thatΛa ∪ {K 1 ∨ · · · ∨ K n} is E-unsatisfiable it is enough to observe
thatΛa |= Lai for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Compact) Immediate.
Assert) LetΛ ⊢ Φ be the premise sequent andΛ, L ⊢ Φ the conclusion sequent whereΛa ∪ Φc |=
La. Clearly, every E-interpretation that satisfiesΛa ∪ Φc is also a model ofΛa ∪ {La} ∪ Φc which is
the same as (Λ ∪ {L})a ∪ Φc.
25 By a light abuse of notation, we use each Ki ’s to denote both a rewrite literal of the form (¬)si → ti and its corresponding
equational literal (¬)si ≈ ti . Similarly for Li later.
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Simp) LetΛ ⊢ Φ, C · Γ be the premise sequent andΛ ⊢ Φ, C ′ · Γ ′ the conclusion sequent where
Λa ∪ (Φ ∪ {C · Γ })c |= (C ′ · Γ ′)c. The argument is analogous to the previous case. 
Proposition 7.2. For all sets Ψ of clauses, if Ψ has a refutation tree then Ψ is E-unsatisfiable.
Proof. Let TΨ be a refutation tree of a set Ψ = {C1, . . . , Cn} of parameter-free clauses. We prove
below by structural induction that the root of any subtree of TΨ is a-unsatisfiable. This will entail in
particular that ¬v ⊢ Φ0, the root of TΨ itself, is a-unsatisfiable, where Φ0 = {C1 · ∅, . . . , Cn · ∅}.
The claim will then follow from the immediate fact that the sequent ¬v ⊢ Φ0 is a-unsatisfiable iff
{¬v}a ∪ Φc0, which coincides with Ψ , has no satisfying E-interpretation.
Let T be a subtree of TΨ and let N be its root. If T is a one-node tree, since TΨ is a refutation tree, N
can only have the formΛ ⊢ Φ, ·∅, which is clearly a-unsatisfiable. If T hasmore than one node, we
can assume by induction that all the children nodes ofN are a-unsatisfiable. But thenwe can conclude
that N is a-unsatisfiable as well by the contrapositive of Lemma 7.1. 
Lemma Appendix A.11. Let C · Γ be a constrained clause. If C · Γ is redundant wrt.Λj ⊢ Φj, for some
j < κ , then C · Γ is redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB.
Proof. The proof works in essentially the sameway as in Bachmair et al. (1994). As a convenience, we
denote the union of all context literals or all clauses of a branch B = (Ni)i<κ by Λ+B =

i<κ Λi and
Φ+B =

i<κ Φi, respectively.
Suppose that C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λj ⊢ Φj. Since Λ+B ⊇ Λj and Φ+B ⊇ Φj, Lemma Appendix
A.5 implies that C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ+B ⊢ Φ+B . (observe that each derivation rule can add only
literals to a context that are non-contradictory with the context.) Now observe that every constrained
clause in Φ+B \ ΦB has been deleted at some node of the branch B, which is only possible if it was
redundant wrt. some Λk ⊢ Φk with k < κ . Again using Lemma Appendix A.5, we see that every
constrained clause inΦ+B \ΦB is redundantwrt.Λ+B ⊢ Φ+B . HenceΦB is obtained fromΦ+B by deleting
redundant clauses, and ΛB is obtained from Λ+B by deleting rewrite literals by Compact that satisfy
the conditions of Lemma Appendix A.5. By using Lemma Appendix A.5 a third time, we conclude that
C · Γ is redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB. 
Lemma Appendix A.12. Every Deduce inference that is redundant wrt. Λj ⊢ Φj, for some j < κ , is
redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma Appendix A.11 using Lemma Appendix A.6. 
Proposition 7.4 (Exhausted Branches are Saturated). If B is an exhausted branch of a limit tree of a fair
derivation thenΛB ⊢ ΦB is saturated.
Proof. Suppose B is an exhausted branch of a limit tree of some fair derivation. We have to show
that every ME E inference with a mandatory derivation rule with premise ΛB ⊢ ΦB is redundant
wrt. ΛB ⊢ ΦB. We do this by assuming such an inference and carrying out a case analysis wrt. the
derivation rule applied.
By Definition 7.3 there is no Close inference with premise Λi ⊢ Φi, for no i < κ , with a
persistent closing clause and persistent closing literals. But then there is no Close inference with
premiseΛB ⊢ ΦB either. (Because if there were, for a large enough i there would be Close inference
with premiseΛi ⊢ Φi, which we excluded.) Thus there is nothing to show for Close.
If the derivation rule is Split then let  · Γ be the selected clause. There are only finitely many
literals K , modulo renaming and modulo sign, that are more general than a given literal or set of
literals such as Γ . The applicability conditions of the derivation rules makes sure that from some time
k onwards, no more such literal K will be added to or removed fromΛk,Λk+1, . . . . (See Lemma 4.14
in Baumgartner and Tinelli (2008) for a proof).We are given that ·Γ is persistent. Therefore suppose
also  · Γ ∈ Φk,Φk+1, . . . , or choose k big enough. Together this shows that a Split inference with
premiseΛi ⊢ Φi exists (i could be k or smaller). ByDefinition 7.3 then, theSplit inference is redundant
wrt. Λj ⊢ Φj, for some j < κ with j ≥ i. By redundancy, this means that the selected clause  · Γ
is redundant wrt.Λj ⊢ Φj. Now use Lemma Appendix A.11 to conclude that  · Γ is redundant wrt.
ΛB ⊢ ΦB, and so the Split inference with selected clause  · Γ is redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB.
If the derivation rule is Deduce then by Definition 7.3 it is redundant wrt.Λj ⊢ Φj, for some j ≥ i,
and by Lemma Appendix A.12 it is redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB. 
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Theorem 7.5 (Completeness). Let Ψ be a clause set and T be the limit tree of a fair derivation of Ψ . If T is
not a refutation tree then Ψ is satisfiable; more specifically, for every exhausted branch B of T with limit
sequentΛB ⊢ ΦB it holdsΛB, RΛB |= (ΦB)ΛB and R⋆ΛB |= Ψ .
Proof. Suppose T is not a refutation tree and let B an exhausted branch of T. By Proposition 7.4 the
limit sequentΛB ⊢ ΦB is saturated. It is easy to see thatΛB is non-contradictory (the context in the
initial sequent of the derivation is non-contradictory, and all derivation rules preserve this property).
By Theorem 6.6 then (ΛB, RΛB) |= (ΦB)ΛB .
To show R⋆ΛB |= Ψ , let C ∈ Ψ be any clause from Ψ , and it suffices to show R⋆ΛB |= C . By definition
of derivation, C ·∅ ∈ Φ1. If C ·∅ ∈ ΦB then the second part of Theorem 6.6 gives R⋆ΛB |= C immediately.
Otherwise assume C · ∅ /∈ ΦB. Hence C · ∅ has been removed at some time k < κ from the clause
set Φk of the sequent Λk ⊢ Φk by an application of the Simp rule. By definition of Simp, C · ∅ is
redundant wrt. Λk+1 ⊢ Φk+1. By Lemma Appendix A.11, C · ∅ is redundant wrt. ΛB ⊢ ΦB. Since
C · ∅ has an empty constraint, all its ground closures are relevant, and by Proposition Appendix A.4,
all relevant closures wrt.ΛB are redundant wrt.ΛB ⊢ ΦB, hence they are entailed wrt.ΛB by clauses
in (ΦB)ΛB . With ΛB, RΛB |= (ΦB)ΛB , the first part of the theorem, which is already proved, we get
ΛB, RΛB |= C · ∅. With the constraint being empty, R⋆ΛB |= C follows immediately. 
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